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 Segment Disclosure Transparency and Internal Capital Market Efficiency: 
Evidence from SFAS No. 131 
 
Abstract 
 
Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on 
internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally 
viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal 
capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency 
by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in 
capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In 
addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for 
firms that suffered more severe agency problems before the adoption of SFAS 131 and also 
for firms whose managers faced stronger incentives to improve efficiency after the adoption 
of SFAS 131. My results suggest that more transparent segment information can help resolve 
agency conflicts in the internal capital markets of diversified firms, thus improving 
investment efficiency.     
 
Keywords: SFAS 131, Segment Disclosures, Transparency, Agency Costs, Internal Capital 
Markets  
JEL Classification: M41, G31, G34, L20 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction  
        Using the mandatory adoption of SFAS 131, this study examines the effect of segment 
disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. Effective for firms with fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 1997, SFAS 131 requires that segments be defined as 
internally viewed by managers, thus enhancing the quality of segment information in 
financial reporting.
1
 More specifically, SFAS 131 improves the transparency of capital 
allocations across segments characterized by different opportunities, thereby improving 
shareholders’ ability to monitor managers.  
        This study is motivated by the observation that SFAS 131 renders managerial actions 
more transparent. Studies have reported that SFAS 131 has achieved its goal of providing 
investors with better information about organizational structures and segment performance 
(Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Street et al. 2000; Berger and Hann 2003; Ettredge et al. 2005; 
Botosan et al. 2009). For example, Berger and Hann (2003) find that single-to-multiple firms 
(i.e., those reported as single-segment firms under SFAS 14 but as multiple-segment firms 
under SFAS 131) suffered a value decrease upon adoption of SFAS 131, indicating that 
SFAS 131 revealed agency problems associated with the internal capital markets of 
diversified firms that were previously hidden under SFAS 14.
2
 Their result is consistent with 
SFAS 131 improving the monitoring of managers.  
        Building on the internal capital markets and agency cost literature, I argue that if 
improved monitoring reveals agency problems associated with diversification (as shown in 
Berger and Hann’s (2003) study), it should also reduce them and thereby improve the 
efficiency with which firms allocate capital across segments in internal capital markets. 
                                                 
1
 Superseding SFAS 14 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14, “Financial Reporting for 
Segments of a Business Enterprise”), SFAS 131(“Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, 
“Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information”) requires firms to define their segments 
in a manner consistent with their internal organizational structures for financial reporting purposes. 
2
 I use the terms “diversified firm” and “multiple-segment firm” interchangeably throughout this study to refer 
to a firm that reports multiple operating segments in its 10-K. In addition, I use the terms “stand-alone firm” and 
“single-segment firm” interchangeably to refer to a firm that does not report multiple operating segments. 
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SFAS 131 provides a strong setting in which to investigate this issue. Past research indicates 
that under prior reporting rules that allowed for greater opacity, diversified firms suffered a 
value discount presumably arising out of inefficiencies in internal capital markets (e.g., 
Berger and Ofek 1995; Scharfstein 1998). However, given that such inefficiencies are more 
transparently revealed and thus more heavily penalized by the market under the new 
accounting standard (Berger and Hann 2003), managers are likely to have reduced inefficient 
capital allocations during the post-SFAS 131 period. The results of this study provide 
evidence of the effect of reporting transparency on internal capital market efficiency, an issue 
that has received scant attention in the literature. 
        However, under the competing hypothesis of proprietary costs, incentives to obscure 
segment information arise primarily due to the proprietary costs of disclosures, not the 
agency costs (e.g., Hayes and Lundholm 1996). Preparers expressed concerns about 
proprietary costs during FASB deliberations over SFAS 131 (FASB 1997, para. 62), and 
empirical evidence confirms that proprietary costs drive segment aggregation (Harris 1998; 
Botosan and Stanford 2005; Bens et al. 2011). Under this competing hypothesis, diversified 
firms may have already allocated capital efficiently in their internal markets (as predicted by 
Maksimovic and Phillips’s (2002) conglomerate model), and the adoption of SFAS 131 may 
not necessarily result in an improvement in internal capital market efficiency.  
        To examine the effect of SFAS 131 on internal capital market efficiency, I construct a 
measure of the efficiency with which firms actively allocate capital from low- to high-
opportunity segments. The construction of this measure involves two steps. First, I calculate 
the extent to which capital allocation deviates from a hypothetical level of passive allocation, 
thereby capturing the degree of active capital allocation. I regard capital allocation as passive 
if it is determined proportionately using a benchmark such as segment sales. Second, for each 
segment, I regard a positive (negative) deviation from passive capital allocation as efficient if 
3 
 
the segment has higher (lower) opportunities relative to its sibling segments in the same 
firm.
3
 
        To isolate the effect of changes in segment disclosure transparency, I take a difference-
in-differences approach with firm-fixed effects. The treatment firms (labeled change firms) 
are a group of diversified firms that improved their segment disclosure transparency by 
changing their segment definitions upon adopting SFAS 131, and the control firms (labeled 
no-change firms) are those that did not. Although SFAS 131 adoption was mandatory, firms 
were not required to change segment definitions if their reported segments were already 
consistent with the manner in which they are internally viewed by managers. These are 
classified as no-change firms and are used as a control group in this study.
4
 
        Consistent with the hypothesis that the efficiency of internal capital markets improved 
after the adoption of SFAS 131, I find that change firms on average allocated more (less) 
capital to segments with higher (lower) opportunities in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to 
the pre-SFAS 131 period to a greater extent than did no-change firms. This result is 
consistent with the claim that high-quality disclosures improve external monitoring and 
therefore investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2013). This finding is 
unlikely to be a mere artifact of better disclosure under the new reporting regime because the 
analysis uses segment data prepared under the same standard for both the pre- and post-SFAS 
131 periods. In other words, I use hand-collected segment information restated in compliance 
with SFAS 131 (disclosed in the 10-Ks filed in the first year after SFAS 131) as the pre-
SFAS 131 segment data for change firms.          
        I then conduct a couple of cross-sectional analyses to reinforce the inference derived 
from the above result. The first analysis relates to agency costs: If the increase in efficiency 
observed after the adoption of SFAS 131 results from improved monitoring (or a reduction in 
                                                 
3
 Segment opportunities are proxied for by the qs of industries in which the segments operate. 
4
 For my identification strategy to work, the classification of change versus no-change firms must be exogenous. 
To the extent that it is not exogenous, my results could be biased. This issue is discussed further in Section 3.2. 
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agency costs), then the effect of SFAS 131 is expected to be greater for change firms that 
suffered more severe agency problems during the pre-SFAS 131 period. Consistent with this 
idea, I find that the effect of SFAS 131 was greater for change firms monitored more weakly 
by boards of directors during the pre-SFAS 131 period. In addition, I find that improvements 
in capital allocation efficiency were greater for change firms that enjoyed more diversified 
internal capital markets before the adoption of SFAS 131. This result is in line with prior 
research that documents that diversified firms trade at a discount and that the value loss 
increases with diversification (Berger and Ofek 1995).  
        The other cross-sectional analysis relates to managers’ incentives to improve efficiency. 
More specifically, I predict that the effect of SFAS 131 will be greater for change firms 
whose managers were provided with greater incentives to improve the efficiency of internal 
capital markets. In particular, under enhanced transparency during the post-SFAS 131 period, 
managers are likely to have stronger incentives to improve efficiency if they are less 
protected against the threat of takeover by corporate raiders or activist investors. Consistent 
with this prediction, using Gompers et al.’s (2003) measure of takeover threats, I find that the 
effect of SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency was greater for change firms whose 
managers faced a greater threat of takeover. 
        I conduct several additional tests to provide further insights. First, if improved 
transparency lowers information asymmetry, then the observed improvement in capital 
allocation efficiency might have resulted from a reduction in the costs of capital rather than 
agency costs. To address this concern, I show that my results are robust to controlling for the 
costs of capital. Moreover, I find that change firms reduced their inefficient investments (i.e., 
capital allocated to lower opportunity segments) after the adoption of SFAS 131, a result not 
5 
 
expected under the cost of capital story alone.
5
 This result also mitigates the alternative 
explanation that enhanced efficiency might have resulted from change firms investing in 
more promising segments (previously hidden but now revealed) to preempt entry by potential 
competitors (Dixit 1980).  
        In addition, despite the mandatory nature of SFAS 131 adoption, the no-change group 
may include firms that should have changed segment definitions under a “neutral” application 
of SFAS 131 but decided to remain no-change firms. To the extent that the control group 
includes firms that strategically decided to remain no-change firms, the change versus no-
change classification is less exogenous. Focusing on proprietary costs as an incentive for 
firms to strategically remain no-change firms, I confirm that my results are robust to a 
subsample of firms that excludes no-change firms identified as more likely to be strategically 
noncompliant with SFAS 131. 
        Finally, I examine whether change firms were more likely to divest their segments with 
low profitability or less likely to make acquisitions in peripheral segments after the adoption 
of SFAS 131. Using segment ROAs as an outcome variable, I find that change firms 
increased their tendency to either dispose of segments with lower profitability or acquire 
segments with higher profitability after adopting SFAS 131. Consistent with SFAS 131 
improving the monitoring of managers, this result suggests that change firms are more 
sensitive to the profitability of their segments in making acquisition and disposal decisions in 
the post-SFAS 131 period.  
        This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the 
stream of accounting literature that seeks to link accounting quality to investment efficiency.
6
 
                                                 
5
 Under the cost of capital story, the increase in efficiency is more likely to result from an increase in efficient 
investments (i.e., capital allocated to higher opportunity segments) due to lower costs of capital.  
6
 For example, see Bushman and Smith (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), Bens and Monahan (2004), Biddle and 
Hilary (2006), Lambert et al. (2007), Hope and Thomas (2008), McNichols and Stubben (2008), Biddle et al. 
(2009), Beatty et al. (2010a), Beatty et al. (2010b), Francis and Martin (2010), Bushman et al. (2011), and 
Cheng et al. (2013). 
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While this literature has struggled to cleanly identify the effects of transparency in financial 
reporting, my study takes advantage of a unique setting in which changes in the disclosure 
quality of segment information are exogenously enforced by mandatory accounting standards. 
In addition, whereas existing studies mainly focus on the role that reporting quality plays in 
mitigating financing constraints in external capital markets, my study is among the first to 
establish a link between disclosure quality and internal capital markets.
7
 
        Second, this study contributes to the internal capital market literature in finance and 
management. Previous studies have produced mixed results regarding whether diversification 
destroys firm value. For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) and Scharfstein (1998) claim that 
diversification creates a value discount due to agency problems associated with inefficient 
internal capital markets. In contrast, Campa and Kedia (2000) suggest that the apparent 
“diversification discount” results from a failure to control for a firm’s endogenous decision to 
diversify. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that firms allocate resources across 
segments in a way that is consistent with optimal behavior. The positive effect of SFAS 131 
that I document in this study is contrary to the implications of Maksimovic and Phillips’s 
(2002) conglomerate model. The results of my study are in line with the findings of Bens and 
Monahan (2004), suggesting that disclosures are influential in monitoring and disciplining 
managers. 
        Finally, this study contributes to a stream of accounting studies on segment disclosure. 
While Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) report that proprietary costs drive 
segment aggregation, Berger and Hann (2007) suggest that agency costs also play a role in 
firms’ decisions to aggregate segments. Using confidential U.S. Census Bureau plant-level 
data, Bens et al. (2011) identify both agency and proprietary costs as key factors affecting 
                                                 
7
 Diversified firms reportedly rely less on external financing because they can use internal capital markets to 
fund their projects (Ettredge et al. 2006). Without the evidence reported in this study, one could argue that 
disclosure quality matters less for diversified firms seeking to make efficient investments. However, this study 
suggests that disclosure quality does matter because it facilitates more efficient internal capital allocation. 
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segment aggregation. My study extends these studies by documenting the effects of SFAS 
131 adoption on affected firms. In addition, my results indicate that SFAS 131 accomplished 
its stated goal of providing investors with better information about how diversified firms 
operate their segments and how each segment performs (FASB 1997, para. 3-8).          
        The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 explains the measure of capital allocation 
efficiency and the research design. Section 4 discusses the data and sample selection, and 
Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Section 6 discusses additional analyses, and 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and Agency Costs 
        The “unraveling” argument suggests that full disclosures are the only equilibrium given 
the fear of what silence may signal (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 
1981). However, partial disclosures arise in a model of discretionary disclosures when the 
presence of competitors is factored in (e.g., Verrecchia 1983; Darrough and Stoughton 1990; 
Wagenhofer 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992). This literature generally supports an equilibrium 
in which firms compare the proprietary costs of disclosures with their capital market benefits. 
Partial disclosures also arise when uncertainty regarding a firm’s information endowment 
comes into play (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988). In these models, sellers do not fully 
disclose their private information, thus taking advantage of buyers’ lack of knowledge about 
whether sellers are endowed with such information. In other words, firms disclose 
information voluntarily only if it is sufficiently favorable to do so. 
        Given that segment reporting has been mandated in the U.S. for decades, the prior 
literature has focused on the level of segment aggregation, an area in which managers 
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exercise some discretion (in particular, before the adoption of SFAS 131). For example, 
Hayes and Lundholm (1996) present a model that describes how a firm chooses an 
appropriate level of segment aggregation when its disclosures are observed by both 
competitors and the capital market. Under the assumption of complete reporting flexibility, 
their results show that the firm aggregates its activities as a single segment when the 
outcomes of each activity are sufficiently disparate, consistent with the proprietary cost 
model of discretionary disclosures. The model predicts, however, that when the outcomes of 
each activity are sufficiently similar (in which case competitors learn little), the firm 
disaggregates its activities into separate segments to enjoy capital market benefits. Harris 
(1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) support this prediction by finding that the 
competitiveness of industries in which firms operate affects managers’ reporting decisions 
with respect to whether to aggregate segments. 
        Another friction that prevents firms from disclosing information is agency costs (Nagar 
1999; Nagar et al. 2003). Unlike the proprietary cost hypothesis which assumes that 
managers share the same objectives with shareholders, agency theory suggests that to 
maximize their own utility, managers may fail to disclose information at the expense of firm 
value (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). With respect to segment reporting, Berger and Hann (2007) 
document that agency costs are a driving factor in segment aggregation by finding that 
managers were more likely to hide segments with lower abnormal profits (rather than higher 
abnormal profits) during the pre-SFAS 131 period. Using confidential U.S. Census Bureau 
plant-level data, Bens et al. (2011) also identify agency costs as one of the key factors 
affecting segment aggregation. 
 
2.2. SFAS 131 and Internal Capital Markets 
9 
 
        The adoption of SFAS 131 significantly reduced managers’ discretion to aggregate 
segments by requiring firms to define segments in a manner consistent with their internal 
organizational structures. Previous studies have examined the effect of SFAS 131 on the 
information environment. Herrmann and Thomas (2000) and Street et al. (2000) find that 
SFAS 131 induced firms to increase the number of reported segments and provide more 
disaggregated information. Berger and Hann (2003) note a significant reduction in analysts’ 
forecast errors after SFAS 131 adoption, providing evidence that its implementation enabled 
analysts to access information previously hidden under SFAS 14. In addition, Ettredge et al. 
(2005) find that SFAS 131 increased the stock market’s ability to predict a firm’s future 
earnings. All of these findings point to an increase in the transparency of segment 
information after the adoption of SFAS 131.
8
   
        Enhanced transparency also improves the monitoring environment by rendering 
managers’ actions more observable. Berger and Hann (2003) provide evidence for this effect 
in finding that single-to-multiple firms (i.e., those reported as single-segment firms under 
SFAS 14 but as multiple-segment firms under SFAS 131) suffered a decrease in value upon 
the adoption of SFAS 131, suggesting that SFAS 131 revealed previously hidden agency 
problems associated with the inefficiency of internal capital markets.
9
 They also find a 
contraction of internal capital markets upon adoption of SFAS 131, suggesting that the 
standard induced real changes in managerial behavior.
10
 
                                                 
8
 Hope and Thomas (2008) document an adverse effect of SFAS 131 by focusing on geographic earnings 
disclosures. Under SFAS 131, firms are not required to disclose geographic earnings if their operating segments 
are defined on any basis other than geography. 
9
 It may also be interpreted as a result of increased proprietary costs. However, it is not certain whether a 
mandated accounting change can impose large proprietary costs on a sample of public firms (Berger and Hann 
2007). 
10
 Under an efficient internal capital market model such as that used by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), the 
contraction of internal capital markets may decrease their efficiency. However, under the inefficient internal 
capital market hypothesis (e.g., Rajan et al. 2000), contraction may imply a reduction in inefficiency. Whether 
SFAS 131 has resulted in more efficient internal capital markets remains unclear and therefore is the focus of 
my study.  
10 
 
        As discussed in the finance literature, the inefficient internal capital market hypothesis 
suggests that diversified firms tend to misallocate their resources in internal capital markets 
and thus to destroy firm value. This inefficiency is often related to agency costs such as 
CEOs’ desires for “empire building” or rent-seeking behavior among divisional managers, 
which provides an explanation of why managers finance pet projects with negative net 
present values or subsidize poorly performing divisions that would not survive if they were 
stand-alone firms. Empirical evidence also confirms that diversified firms fail to allocate their 
capital efficiently in internal capital markets because of agency problems, leading to a value 
discount (e.g., Stulz 1990; Berger and Ofek 1995; Scharfstein 1998; Scharfstein and Stein 
2000; Rajan et al. 2000).
11
  
        Consistent with this line of reasoning, I expect that if the adoption of SFAS 131 
improved monitoring, then post-adoption, managers would be likely to find it more costly to 
acquire, keep, or subsidize divisions with poor investment opportunities. Because any 
inefficient cross-segment capital transfers are more transparently revealed and thus more 
strongly penalized by the market under the new accounting standard (Berger and Hann 2003), 
managers are likely to have reduced such transfers and/or increased more efficient transfers 
in internal capital markets during the post-SFAS 131 period. To test this idea, I compare the 
effect of SFAS 131 on a group of diversified firms that improved segment disclosure 
transparency by changing segment definitions (“change firms”) to the effect of the same 
standard on a control group of diversified firms that did not (“no-change firms”). This 
hypothesis is formally stated in the alternative form as follows: 
 
                                                 
11
 Internal capital markets are not necessarily inefficient. If manager and shareholder incentives are aligned 
(through monitoring or contracts), internal capital markets can create value by enabling a segment to fund a 
positive net present value project that cannot be financed using external capital markets (due to information 
asymmetry or high external financing costs). Moreover, internal capital markets may even achieve more 
efficient capital allocation than external capital markets if CEOs have project quality information superior to 
that possessed by external capital providers (Weston 1970; Williamson 1975; Gertner et al. 1994; Stein 1997).  
11 
 
H1: Change firms experienced a greater improvement in capital allocation efficiency in 
internal capital markets in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period 
than did no-change firms. 
 
        However, under the competing hypothesis of proprietary costs, incentives to obscure 
segment information arise primarily due to the proprietary costs of disclosures, not the 
agency costs (e.g., Hayes and Lundholm 1996). Some prior studies also suggest that 
diversified firms have already allocated their resources efficiently in internal capital markets 
and that the observed value discount of diversified firms is expected even in the absence of 
agency costs, with the value losses attributed to a research design problem (e.g., Campa and 
Kedia 2002; Graham et al. 2002; Maksimovic and Phillips 2002; Villalonga 2004b; Chevalier 
2004). For example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that firms grow, diversify into 
different industries, and allocate resources across segments in a manner consistent with 
optimal behavior, depending on each firm’s comparative productivity advantages across 
industries. Under this competing hypothesis, the adoption of SFAS 131 would not result in a 
significant improvement in internal capital market efficiency if firms had previously allocated 
their capital efficiently.
12
 
 
2.3. The Role of Agency Costs and Managers’ Incentives 
        Given that H1 assumes that change firms, but not no-change firms, have incentives to 
improve efficiency (due to the pressure from the market or shareholders), I further consider 
                                                 
12
 Campa and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004b), and Chevalier (2004) attribute diversification discounts to 
selection bias; that is, a failure to account for the endogeneity between a firm’s decision to diversify and firm 
value. Furthermore, by constructing more objective business units using the Business Information Tracking 
Series (BITS) database, Villalonga (2004a) finds a diversification premium, which indicates the possibility that 
the discount is an artifact of noisy segment data under SFAS 14. Similarly, Graham et al. (2002) find that while 
acquiring firms’ excess values decline after diversifying events, half or more of the discount occurs because 
firms acquire already discounted business units. However, Lamont and Polk (2002) and Burch and Nanda (2003) 
provide evidence that it is diversification itself, rather than selection bias or measurement error, which causes 
diversification discounts, a finding that is consistent with the inefficient internal capital market hypothesis. 
12 
 
the following cross-sectional variations in the effects of SFAS 131. First, I expect the effect 
of SFAS 131 to vary with agency problems. To capture agency problems, I first focus on 
internal monitoring, because SFAS 131-type segment information is available to insiders 
such as managers and boards of directors, even before the adoption of SFAS 131. If managers 
were strongly monitored by boards of directors during the pre-SFAS 131 period, they were 
likely to have already allocated capital efficiently before the adoption of SFAS 131. 
Accordingly, the incremental effect of SFAS 131 adoption would be minimal for firms with 
strong internal monitoring. In addition, prior research indicates that diversified firms trade at 
a discount and that the value loss increases with diversification, suggesting that more 
diversified firms are likely to face higher agency costs of inefficient internal capital markets 
(Berger and Ofek 1995). Therefore, to the extent that any improvement in efficiency results 
from improved monitoring (or a reduction in agency costs), the effect of SFAS 131 should be 
greater for change firms that suffered more severe agency problems during the pre-SFAS 131 
period, i.e., those with weaker boards of directors or more diversified internal capital markets. 
This hypothesis is formally stated in the alternative form as follows: 
 
H2: The improvement in capital allocation efficiency, as stated in H1, was greater for change 
firms that suffered more severe agency problems (proxied for by the monitoring of boards of  
directors and the extent of diversification) during the pre-SFAS 131 period than for other 
change firms. 
 
        Second, the effect of SFAS 131 is also likely to vary with managers’ incentives to 
improve efficiency during the post-SFAS 131 period. More specifically, I predict that the 
effect of SFAS 131 will be greater for change firms whose managers had stronger incentives 
to improve efficiency in internal capital markets. In particular, under enhanced transparency 
13 
 
during the post-SFAS 131 period, if managers are less protected against the threat of takeover 
by corporate raiders or activist investors, they are likely to have stronger incentives to 
improve efficiency to avoid being a target and losing their jobs.
13
 This leads to my third 
hypothesis, which I present in the alternative form as follows: 
         
H3: The improvement in capital allocation efficiency, as stated in H1, was greater for change 
firms whose managers had stronger incentives to improve capital allocation efficiency 
(proxied for by the threat of takeover) during the post-SFAS 131 period than for other change 
firms. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Measure of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
        To examine the effect of SFAS 131 on internal capital market efficiency, I construct a 
measure of the efficiency with which firms actively allocate capital from low- to high-
opportunity segments.
14
 The construction of this measure involves two steps. First, I calculate 
the extent to which capital allocation deviates from a hypothetical level of passive allocation, 
thereby capturing the degree of active capital allocation. I regard capital allocation as passive 
if it is proportionate to segment sales. The idea behind this approach is that internal capital 
markets are not considered active if investment by a segment of a diversified firm is 
determined only by reinvestment of the segment’s own proceeds (Shin and Stulz 1998). 
Second, for each segment, I regard a positive (negative) deviation from passive capital 
allocation as efficient if the segment has higher (lower) opportunities relative to its sibling 
                                                 
13
 Note that boards of directors and the threat of takeover are generally used as proxies for corporate governance. 
However, unlike boards of directors, corporate raiders were not able to access SFAS 131-type segment 
information before the adoption of SFAS 131.  
14
 Like other measures of internal capital markets adopted in prior studies (e.g., Rajan et al. 2000; Billet and 
Mauer 2003), this measure of capital allocation efficiency focuses on capital expenditure because it is the only 
investment-related segment item commonly disclosed in segment reporting. This makes it crucial to control for 
asset mix in regressions.  
14 
 
segments in the same firm. Segment opportunities are proxied for by the qs of industries in 
which the segments operate.
15
 
        More specifically, the deviation from a passive capital allocation for segment j of firm i 
in year t is calculated as follows: 
 
CAPX deviationijt = 



n
j
ijt
ijt
n
j
ijt
ijt
Sale
Sale
CAPX
CAPX
11
, 
where CAPXijt is capital expenditures of segment j of firm i in year t, Saleijt is sales of 
segment j of firm i in year t, and n is the number of segments in firm i.16  
 
        To measure the efficiency of capital allocation, I define the Signed CAPX deviation for 
each segment as follows: 
 
Signed CAPX deviationijt = (+1) × CAPX deviationijt  if  ijt >  
 ̅it, 
Signed CAPX deviationijt = (-1) × CAPX deviationijt  if  ijt  <=  
 ̅it, 
where  ijt is the q for segment j of firm i in year t, and  ̅it is the corresponding asset-weighted 
average   of firm i’s remaining segments (excluding segment j) in year t.  
 
        Signed CAPX deviation takes a more positive value if a segment with higher (lower) 
opportunities receives more (less) capital than would be expected under passive capital 
allocation. In contrast, it takes a more negative value if a segment with higher (lower) 
                                                 
15
 I use the median q of single-segment firms operating in the same industry to estimate the segment’s q. The 
segment's industry is defined on the basis of the narrowest SIC grouping (starting with four digits) that yields at 
least five single-segment firms with non-missing q values. A firm’s q is calculated as (market value of common 
stock + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt) / book value of total assets. 
16
 Later, in Section 5.2, I introduce a variation of this measure of capital allocation efficiency adjusted for the 
capital intensity of each segment, in which segment sales are further normalized by the industry’s capital 
intensity. 
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opportunities receives less (more) capital than would be expected under passive capital 
allocation. I then calculate the firm-level measure of capital allocation efficiency by weight-
averaging Signed CAPX deviations across segments within a firm, using segment assets to 
calculate weights. 
 
Capital Allocation Efficiencyit  = 

n
j
ijtw
1
 Signed CAPX deviationijt 
where wijt = 


n
j
ijt
ijt
BA
BA
1
, 
BAijt is the book asset of segment j of firm i in year t, wijt is segment j’s share of the total asset 
of firm i, and n is the number of segments in firm i.  
 
        To assess whether this measure is a valid proxy for capital allocation efficiency, I 
regress abnormal returns on this measure after controlling for earnings, changes in earnings, 
and firm- and year-fixed effects (as a validation test). Given that the idea behind this measure 
is that transfers of capital from lower to higher q segments are more value-enhancing than 
those from higher to lower q segments, if it is a valid proxy for capital allocation efficiency, 
this measure should significantly predict an increase in firm value. The results of this test 
show that Capital Allocation Efficiency is significantly positive for abnormal returns (as 
reported in Online Appendix Table A1), suggesting that it successfully captures the value-
increasing actions of managers when allocating capital in internal capital markets.
17
 
                                                 
17
 Note that this measure of capital allocation efficiency implicitly assumes that firms are capital-constrained. If 
firms are not capital-constrained, then all of the segments would deserve additional capital, provided they have 
positive net present value projects. This would invalidate the current approach (i.e., measuring efficiency based 
on relative investment compared to other segments of the same firm). To mitigate this concern, I control for the 
heterogeneity of financing constraints among firms using several proxies, such as external financing, cash 
holding, leverage, and dividends in regressions. In addition, I use an alternative measure of internal capital 
market efficiency developed by Rajan et al (2000), in which investment in a segment is compared to 
investments in industry peers, not investments in other segments of the same firm. Although this measure also 
has its own problems, it does not necessarily assume that firms are capital-constrained. Section 6.4 discusses this 
measure further.  
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3.2. Regression Model 
        To isolate the effect of SFAS 131 on internal capital market efficiency, I conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis with firm-fixed effects. The treatment firms (labeled 
change firms) are a group of diversified firms that improved their segment disclosure 
transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131, and the control 
firms (labeled no-change firms) are those that did not.18 Typical of most empirical studies, the 
change versus no-change classification is not randomly assigned. The change group is likely 
to be composed of more firms with higher incentives to hide true segments, forced to change 
their segment definitions because of the adoption of SFAS 131. Therefore, along with the 
difference-in-differences approach, I conduct analyses with a firm-fixed effect, using the firm 
as its own control. The firm-fixed effect ensures that my results are not attributable to 
unobservable time-invariant differences between the two groups. More specifically, in testing 
H1, I estimate the following regression equation: 
 
Capital Allocation Efficiency = α0 + α1Post 131 + α2Post 131 × Change Firm + α3Log(Mktval) 
+ α4MTB+ α5Cash Flow  +  α6CAPEX +  α7CAPEX Change +  α8NonCAPEX +  α9Tangibility 
+ α10 External Financing + α11 Cash Holding + α12 Leverage + α13 Dividend  
 + α14Board Independence + α15Number of Segments  + α16Segment Profit Variability  
+ α17Segment Industry Diversity + α18Speed of Profit Adjustment + α19Concentration Ratio  
+ α20Segment Earnings Persistence + Firm Dummies  + Year Dummies +  ε                           (1) 
 
Post 131 is an indicator variable that equals one for the post-SFAS 131 period and zero 
otherwise. Post 131 × Change Firm is the product of Post 131 and Change Firm, where 
Change Firm is an indicator variable that equals one for change firms and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
18
 Although all firms should adopt the changes in segment reporting introduced by SFAS 131, if a firm already 
reported its segments in a manner aligned with internal organizational structures (as demanded by SFAS 131), it 
did not need to change its segment definitions upon the adoption of SFAS 131. 
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Note that Change Firm is subsumed by firm dummies and dropped from the regression. If H1 
is true, then the coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm (i.e., α2) should be significantly 
positive. In addition, the regression includes a group of control variables to control for the 
effects of firm characteristics such as firm size (Log(Mktval)), growth opportunities (MTB), 
operating performance (Cash Flows), capital expenditure levels (CAPEX), capital 
expenditure changes (CAPEX Change), asset mix (NonCAPEX and Tangibility), financing 
constraints (External Financing, Cash Holding, Leverage, and Dividend), and monitoring 
(Board Independence).  
        The control variables also include a group of segment characteristics identified by prior 
research as correlated with firms’ reporting choices following SFAS 131 (Berger and Hann 
2007) and believed to affect capital allocation efficiency. More specifically, I use variables 
such as Number of Segments, Segment Profit Variability, and Segment Industry Diversity to 
control for the effects of segment diversity. Prior research suggests that firms with greater 
segment diversity are more likely to misallocate internal resources (e.g., Berger and Ofek 
1995; Rajan et al. 2000). In addition, I control for a segment’s industry competitiveness, 
using Speed of Profit Adjustment and Concentration Ratio, as measured in Harris (1998) and 
Botosan and Stanford (2005). Industry competitiveness can influence managers’ behaviors 
(for example, their capital allocation decisions) because product market competition can 
substitute for or complement managerial incentives (Karuna 2007). Finally, following Berger 
and Hann (2007), I include Segment Earnings Persistence as an additional control variable to 
ensure that Speed of Profit Adjustment does not simply capture the persistence of abnormal 
earnings.
19
 (See the Appendix for details on variable construction.)
20
 
                                                 
19
 Standard errors are calculated by clustering industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and year because 
aggregate macroeconomic and industry demand shocks may induce some correlations with capital allocation 
decisions. Throughout this study, I assess statistical significance using one-sided p-values for variables with 
signed predictions and two-sided p-values otherwise.        
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        Note that for this research design to work, assignment to change versus no-change firms 
must be exogenous. Despite the mandatory nature of the accounting standard, however, the 
no-change group may include firms that should have changed segment definitions under a 
“neutral” application of SFAS 131 but decided to remain no-change firms. For example, 
firms facing extremely high proprietary costs might have chosen not to comply with SFAS 
131 if the costs exceeded the benefits of compliance. This possibility is formally addressed in 
Section 6.2. Another possibility to consider is that firms receiving shocks to growth 
opportunities might have chosen to improve financial reporting quality (by changing segment 
definitions) to obtain external capital, which in turn could have resulted in an increase in 
capital allocation efficiency.
21
 However, I do not find evidence that changes in growth 
opportunities are correlated with a firm’s reporting decision upon adoption of SFAS 131. The 
results of this analysis are reported and discussed more in Online Appendix Table A2.      
 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
4.1. Data 
        I obtain segment- and firm-level accounting data from Compustat and firm-level market 
data from CRSP. In addition, for change firms, I collect segment data for the pre-SFAS 131 
period, restated in accordance with SFAS 131, by manually reading the firms’ 10-Ks.22 Using 
the restated data allows me to measure firms’ capital allocation efficiency on the basis of 
segment information prepared under the same standard for both pre- and post-SFAS 131 
periods. This approach eliminates the possibility that any observed improvement in capital 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 The regression models I use to test H2 and H3 are similar to Equation (1), except that I further include 
interaction terms to capture the cross-sectional differences in the effects of SFAS 131. I discuss the regression 
models for H2 and H3 later in corresponding sections. 
21
 Several of the control variables (including Speed of Profit Adjustment and Concentration Ratio) can help 
mitigate this concern. 
22
 Firms disclosed their restated segment data in the 10-Ks filed with the SEC in the year that they first adopted 
SFAS 131. To obtain the segment data of change firms, restated as required by SFAS 131, I use EDGAR, 
provided by the SEC (www.sec.gov), to search for the 10-Ks filed during the year they adopted SFAS 131. For 
firms with 10-Ks not available in EDGAR, I search for their 10-Ks or annual reports through their investor 
relations websites, when possible.  
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allocation efficiency is a mere artifact of more transparent segment disclosures made under 
SFAS 131. For this group of firms (change firms), I use the restated data from the 10-Ks as 
their segment data for the pre-SFAS 131 period and the reported data from Compustat as the 
segment data for the post-SFAS 131 period. For no-change firms, I use the reported data from 
Compustat as the segment data for both pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. Given that most of 
the change firms provided restated segment data for just one or two years preceding their 
adoption of the new standard, my sample is restricted to the four-year period centered on the 
adoption of SFAS 131.
23
 
 
4.2. Sample Selection 
        When selecting my sample, I begin with U.S. firms with multiple business segments that 
appear in Compustat and CRSP during the four-year period centered on the adoption of SFAS 
131.
24
 I exclude firm-years operating in financial service industries (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999) and regulated utility industries (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999).
25
 I then obtain 
6,983 multiple-segment firm-years that can be classified as either change or no-change firms. 
A firm is defined as a change firm if (1) its segments reported in the last year under SFAS 14 
                                                 
23
 Because SFAS 131 was effective for firms with fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997, December 
year-end firms adopted SFAS 131 in 1998, whereas non-December year-end firms adopted this standard in 1999. 
Therefore, for December year-end firms, the pre-SFAS 131 period covers 1996 and 1997, and the post-SFAS 
131 period covers 1998 and 1999. For non-December year-end firms, the pre-SFAS 131 period covers 1997 and 
1998, and the post-SFAS 131 period covers 1999 and 2000. 
24
 To ensure that only business segments appear in the sample, I exclude segments not coded as “BUSSEG” in 
Compustat. In addition, I exclude segments with names starting with “elimination”, “unallocated”, 
“reconciliation”,  “reconciling”, “intra-group”, “not classified”, or similar because they are not actual business 
segments but instead represent adjustments of segment items to firm-level items. Segments with names starting 
with “other”, “all other”, “general corporate”, “corp”, or “corporate” are problematic because some firms use 
these names to refer to the amount by which segment items are adjusted to firm-level items, whereas other firms 
use these names to refer to actual business segments or combinations of minor business segments and the 
adjustment amount. In this study, I exclude segments with these names if the segments’ SIC codes are missing 
or any asset, sale, or capital expenditure has a negative value.   
25
 The segment data from Compustat assign each firm an SIC code (DNUM). DNUM is constant over time 
because it reflects a firm’s most recent industry affiliation rather than its history of industry affiliation. 
Therefore, I use an SIC code from CRSP (SICCD) to eliminate firms operating in the financial service and 
utility industries. However, upon examination, many of the firms classified as financial service or utility firms 
by DNUM and not SICCD have segments in the financial service or utility industries. Therefore, I exclude from 
the sample firms indicated by either DNUM or SICCD as belonging to the financial service or utility industries. 
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are different from those restated under SFAS 131 and (2) the restated segments under SFAS 
131 reveal any additional operations in industries that were not disclosed under SFAS 14. 
Otherwise, a firm is defined as a no-change firm. To implement this classification using 
Compustat data, I compare a firm’s segment identifiers (SIDs) and segment SIC codes in the 
last year under SFAS 14 (i.e., the lag adoption year) with the same firm’s SIDs and segment 
SIC codes in the first year under SFAS 131 (i.e., the adoption year).
26
 
        However, this approach induces a classification bias in that firms with no reporting 
changes but with real changes in their operations are also classified as change firms. 
Therefore, to ensure that the sample consists only of firms with pure reporting changes 
related to the adoption of SFAS 131, following Berger and Hann’s (2003) algorithm, I 
eliminate change firms from the sample if they are contaminated by events other than pure 
reporting changes (e.g., acquisition, divestiture, restructuring, or changes in accounting 
methods). The algorithm compares the sums of segment revenues (and earnings) for the lag 
adoption year between the restated data and historical reports and considers firms as 
contaminated if the difference between the two sums exceeds 1% of the restated sum. Berger 
and Hann’s (2003) algorithm reduces the sample to 5,843 firm-years, producing a “pure” 
sample of diversified firms with no contaminated observations.
27
 
        One problem with using segment data is that multiple-segment firms may not fully 
allocate accounting items to their reported segments. As a result, segment sums are usually 
less than firm figures. Following Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention, for a firm to be 
included in the sample, I require that the sum of its segment sales (assets) be within 1% (25%) 
of its total sales (total assets). For the remaining firms that meet these requirements, I 
explicitly allocate any unallocated portions of assets, sales, and capital expenditures by 
                                                 
26
 Under this classification procedure, early adopters of SFAS 131 could be wrongly classified as no-change 
firms. However, the bias arising from this misclassification would work against my hypothesis. 
27
 Using this “pure” sample of diversified firms together with single-segment firms, Online Appendix Table A3 
provides details on the magnitude of reporting changes induced by SFAS 131 (i.e., a replication of Berger and 
Hann’s (2003) Table 2). 
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grossing the accounting items up or down by the percentage deviation between the segment 
sums and the firm figures. For example, if a firm’s firm-level assets are 10% larger (smaller) 
than the sum of its segment assets, then each segment’s assets are increased (decreased) by 
10%. This procedure reduces the pure sample to 4,493 firm-years.  
        Finally, measuring capital allocation efficiency requires detailed data for segment items 
such as segment sales, segment assets, segment capital expenditures, segment SIC codes, and 
a segment’s industry q. The regression also requires data for control variable measurement. 
This data requirement further decreases the final sample to 1,391 firm-years, including 775 
change firms and 616 no-change firms.
28
 
 
5. Empirical Analyses 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
        Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in the pre- and post-
SFAS 131 periods. In the pre-SFAS 131 period, the mean of Capital Allocation Efficiency is 
-0.0162 in Column 1, indicating that change firms on average allocated less capital to high q 
segments relative to passive allocation by 1.62% of the firms’ capital expenditures. The mean 
of this variable is 0.0122 in Column 2, suggesting that no-change firms allocated more capital 
to high q segments by 1.22%. The mean difference between the change and no-change firms 
in the pre-SFAS 131 period is -0.0285 (in Column 3), which is statistically significant (two-
sided p-value: 0.048). This result is consistent with the observation that change firms that 
obscured segment information before the adoption of SFAS 131 allocated capital less 
efficiently, possibly due to the higher opacity of segment disclosures in the pre-SFAS 131 
period. However, the mean difference in Capital Allocation Efficiency between the two 
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 In cases in which a firm changed its fiscal year-end during the sample period, I exclude the first firm-year 
observation after the fiscal year-end change.    
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groups is no longer significant after the adoption of SFAS 131 (two-sided p-value: 0.518 in 
Column 6). 
        The change in Capital Allocation Efficiency between the pre- and post-SFAS 131 
periods for change firms is 0.0241 (i.e., 0.0079-(-0.0162) from Columns 4 and 1), which is 
positive and statistically significant (two-sided p-value: 0.049 for the t-statistic 1.97, 
untabulated). However, for no-change firms, the change in Capital Allocation Efficiency 
between the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods is -0.0140 (i.e., -0.0018-0.0122 from Columns 5 
and 2), which is not significantly different from zero (two-sided p-value: 0.402 for the t-
statistic 0.84, untabulated). The univariate difference-in-differences results reported in 
Column 7 reveal that the mean effect of SFAS 131 on Capital Allocation Efficiency is 0.0381 
for change firms (relative to no-change firms) and statistically significant (one-sided p-value: 
0.030 for the t-statistic 1.88 in Column 7), which is consistent with H1. However, none of the 
control variables exhibit significant difference-in-differences results in Column 7. 
        Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the aggregate sample. These show 
that the change and no-change firms exhibit significant differences in terms of firm and 
segment characteristics. More specifically, compared with no-change firms, change firms are 
less profitable (Cash Flows), undertake more capital expenditures (CAPEX), hold less PP&E 
(Tangibility), rely more on external financing (External Financing), hold more cash and cash 
equivalents (Cash Holding), have lower leverage (Leverage), are less likely to pay dividends 
(Divided), and have less independent boards of directors (Board Independence). In addition, 
change firms are more diversified (Number of Segments) and exhibit higher profit variability 
across segments (Segment Profit Variability), consistent with change firms having stronger 
incentives to hide segments if allowed to do so (particularly before the adoption of SFAS 
23 
 
131).
29
 In contrast, change firms operate in more similar industries across segments (Segment 
Industry Diversity), consistent with the notion that firms with operations in similar industries 
were afforded greater discretion in aggregating segments before the adoption of SFAS 131 
(Berger and Hann 2007). 
        Furthermore, Speed of Profit Adjustment is significantly higher for change firms than 
for no-change firms.
30
 Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that Speed of 
Profit Adjustment is positively associated with firms’ tendencies to aggregate segments, 
suggesting that firms probably hid operations that enjoyed abnormally high profits and/or 
lower competition before the adoption of SFAS 131. Measured as the Herfindahl Index of 
business sales in each industry, Concentration Ratio is another measure of industry 
competitiveness, with a higher value indicating lower competition. Prior studies find that this 
variable is also positively associated with firms’ tendencies to aggregate segments before the 
adoption of SFAS 131 (Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005). The mean of Concentration 
Ratio is slightly higher for change firms than for no-change firms in my sample, but the 
difference falls short of conventional significance.  
        Panel C of Table 1 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables. It shows 
that Capital Allocation Efficiency is significantly positively correlated with MTB and 
negatively correlated with Cash Flows and Number of Segments. This suggests that firms 
with higher growth opportunities tend to make more efficient capital allocations, but those 
with higher cash flows and highly diversified internal capital markets tend to make less 
efficient capital allocations.  
                                                 
29
 The reasoning behind this is that if a firm has several segments that are similar, it is motivated to hide neither 
the worst-performing (from an agency cost motive perspective) nor the best-performing segment (from a 
proprietary cost motive perspective). These results are consistent with the claim that SFAS 131 improved the 
disclosure transparency of firms that had aggregated segments under the old reporting regime with stronger 
incentives to obscure segment information. 
30
 Speed of Profit Adjustment is measured as the speed with which abnormal profits are driven down to a normal 
rate of return in a given industry, with a higher value indicating a lower speed of abnormal profit adjustment and 
thus a lower level of competition. My result is therefore consistent with the claim that SFAS 131 mandated that 
firms reveal operations (previously concealed) that enjoyed the benefits of lower competition before its adoption. 
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5.2. Analyses of Capital Allocation Efficiency: Testing H1        
        Table 2 presents the results of the regression of Capital Allocation Efficiency, which 
estimates Equation (1). To gauge the sensitivity of the results to sample attrition,
31
 I report 
the results from the full sample in Column 1, the constant sample (i.e., firms that appear in at 
least one year in both the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods) in Column 2, and the balanced 
sample (i.e., firms that appear every year over the four-year sample period) in Column 3.
32
 
        In Panel A of Table 2, Column 1 shows that the coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm 
is 0.0364, which is statistically significant (one-sided p-value: 0.003). This result implies that 
change firms increased their capital allocation to segments with higher opportunities by 3.64% 
of total capital expenditure relative to no-change firms after the adoption of SFAS 131. Given 
that change firms on average allocated less capital to segments with higher opportunities by 
1.62% of total capital expenditures in the pre-SFAS 131 period (as reported in Table 1), the 
magnitude of this coefficient is both economically significant and not too large to be 
plausible. Columns 2 and 3 also show that the coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm are all 
significantly greater than zero (one-sided p-values: 0.003 and 0.021, respectively).
 
With 
respect to the control variables, the coefficients on Log(Mktval), Cash Flows, and Leverage 
are significantly positive in at least one of Columns 1-3.  
        In Panel B of Table 2, I replace the dependent variable with a variant of Capital 
Allocation Efficiency, adjusted for each segment’s capital intensity. I make this adjustment to 
                                                 
31
 Given the ways in which change and no-change firms are defined (as described in Section 4.2), they should 
appear in both the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. However, sample attrition occurs because capital allocation 
efficiency is not measurable in every year for a given firm. Although a firm is present throughout the sample 
period, its segment data may not permit measurement of its capital allocation efficiency. The sample screening 
procedure aggravates this problem. For example, given that a firm may not fully allocate accounting items to its 
reported segments, I follow Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention and require the sum of the firm’s segment 
sales (assets) to be within 1% (25%) of its total sales (total assets) (discussed in Section 4.2). Sample attrition 
occurs when a firm satisfies this requirement in one year but fails in another year. 
32
 Although the identification comes from at least the constant sample under the firm-fixed effect, the coefficient 
on Post 131 × Change Firm can differ between the full and constant samples to the extent that the sample 
attrition from the full to constant samples is far from random.  
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assess whether the results are sensitive to the extent to which segments have different levels 
of capital investment required for operation.
33
 For this reason, when measuring Capital 
Allocation Efficiency, I adjust the CAPX deviation by normalizing segment sales according 
to segments’ industry capital intensities.34 Panel B of Table 2 shows that all of the 
coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm are significantly positive in Columns 1-3 (one-sided 
p-values: 0.012, 0.011, and 0.048, respectively). In addition, these coefficients do not change 
much from Panels A to B in each sample, suggesting that the results are robust to differential 
intensities of capital investment across segments.
35
  
        Overall, the results reported in Table 2 are consistent with H1, suggesting that 
improvements in segment disclosure transparency with the adoption of SFAS 131 helped 
firms achieve more efficient capital allocation in internal capital markets.
36
 
 
5.3. Cross-Sectional Analyses - Role of Agency Costs: Testing H2        
        H2 implies that the effect of SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency was greater for 
change firms that suffered greater agency problems during the pre-SFAS 131 period. In Panel 
A of Table 3, I construct an indicator variable, Weak Board, which takes a value of one for 
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 For example, if a segment operates in a labor-intensive industry, the segment’s required level of capital 
investment need not be as large as that of other segments operating in capital-intensive industries. 
34
 To be more specific, I define the CAPX deviation as (CAPX / Sum of CAPX) – (Normalized Sales / Sum of 
Normalized Sales) in each segment. Normalized Sales are defined as segment sales multiplied by industry 
capital intensity (i.e., the average of the most recent three years’ industry PP&E scaled by industry assets). The 
segment's industry is defined on the basis of the narrowest SIC grouping (starting with four digits) that yields at 
least five single-segment firms with non-missing q values. 
35
 As additional robustness checks, I conduct the following tests. First, the change group includes firms that 
reported a lower number of segments after the adoption of SFAS 131. The inferences remain the same after 
excluding such firms from the sample. Second, for segments operating in R&D-intensive industries, capital 
expenditures are likely to be a noisy proxy for segment investment. I thus recalculate Capital Allocation 
Efficiency after excluding segments operating in industries whose median ratio of R&D to total assets is above 
5%. This procedure decreases the sample size because R&D-intensive firms are effectively removed from the 
sample. The inferences remain the same with this measure of capital allocation efficiency. Online Appendix 
Table A4 reports the results of these analyses. 
36
 In an untabulated analysis, I regress Capital Allocation Efficiency on Post 131 and other control variables 
with firm-fixed effects based on a sample of change firms only. I find that the coefficient on Post 131 is 
significantly positive. However, the coefficient on Post 131 is not significant when I run the same regression 
using a sample of no-change firms. In addition, I find a statistically insignificant decrease in Capital Allocation 
Efficiency for both change and no-change groups from year -2 to year -1 during the pre-SFAS 131 period, thus 
decreasing the possibility that my results are driven by differential trends in capital allocation efficiency 
between the change and no-change groups. 
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firms weakly monitored by their boards of directors and zero otherwise. I classify a firm as 
having a weak board if the average proportion of independent directors on the board (i.e., 
those unaffiliated with the firm) during the pre-SFAS 131 period is lower than its sample 
median (i.e., 75%). I then add the interaction terms of Weak Board with Post 131 and Post 
131 × Change Firm to Equation (1).
37
 The variable of interest is Post 131 × Change Firm × 
Weak Board. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the coefficients on this variable are significantly 
positive in both Columns 1 and 2 (one-sided p-values: 0.009 and 0.005, respectively), which 
suggests that the improvement in capital allocation efficiency was greater for change firms 
monitored by less independent boards of directors during the pre-SFAS 131 period. 
        Prior research suggests that more diversified firms are likely to experience higher 
agency costs of inefficient internal capital markets (Berger and Ofek 1995). In Panel B of 
Table 3, I construct another indicator variable, High Diversification, which takes a value of 
one for firms that reported more than two segments with unrelated operations (i.e., those with 
different two-digit SIC codes) on average during the pre-SFAS 131 period and zero otherwise. 
I then add the interaction terms of High Diversification with Post 131 and Post 131 × Change 
Firm to Equation (1). The variable of interest is Post 131 × Change Firm × High 
Diversification. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the coefficients on this variable are 
significantly positive in Columns 1-3 (one-sided p-values: 0.017, 0.017, and 0.004, 
respectively), indicating that the improvement in capital allocation efficiency was greater for 
change firms that enjoyed more diversified internal capital markets before the adoption of 
SFAS 131. 
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 Note that Change Firm, Weak Board, and Change Firm × Weak Board are dropped from the regression 
because they are subsumed by firm-fixed effects. 
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        Overall, the results reported in Table 3 are consistent with H2, suggesting that the effect 
of SFAS 131 is more pronounced among change firms that suffered higher agency costs of 
internal capital markets during the pre-SFAS 131 period.
 38
 
 
5.4. Cross-Sectional Analyses - Role of Managers’ Incentives: Testing H3        
        H3 implies that SFAS 131 had a greater effect on internal capital markets for change 
firms whose managers faced higher incentives to improve efficiency during the post-SFAS 
131 period. In Table 4, I use Gompers et al.’s (2003) measure of takeover threats (i.e., the G 
index) as a proxy for managers’ incentives. Managers are likely to have stronger incentives to 
improve efficiency if they are less protected against the threat of takeover by corporate 
raiders. I thus construct an indicator variable, High Threat, which takes a value of one for 
firms whose G index, averaged during the post-SFAS 131 period, is below 11.5 and zero 
otherwise.
39
 I then add the interaction terms of High Threat with Post 131 and Post 131 × 
Change Firm to Equation (1). The variable of interest is Post 131 × Change Firm × High 
Threat. Table 4 shows that the coefficients on this variable are significantly positive in 
Columns 1-3 (one-sided p-values: 0.033, 0.025 and 0.039, respectively), indicating that the 
improvement in capital allocation efficiency was greater for change firms whose managers 
faced greater threats of takeover during the post-SFAS 131 period. These results are 
consistent with H3, suggesting that the effect of SFAS 131 was more pronounced among 
                                                 
38
 The inferences remain the same for cross-sectional analyses (relating to both H2 and H3) when the measure of 
capital allocation efficiency is adjusted for each segment’s industry capital intensity. Online Appendix Table A5 
reports the results. 
39
 The 11.5 cutoff corresponds to the upper quartile of the sample distribution of the averaged variable. Note that 
a lower G index value implies less protection of managers against takeover threats. Because the data cover only 
a small fraction of firm-years in the sample, if a firm’s G index is not available in a particular year, I substitute 
data from the closest previous or subsequent year in which the G index is available to maximize the number of 
usable observations. I thank Andrew Metrick for sharing his G index data at 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html.  
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change firms whose managers had stronger incentives to improve capital allocation efficiency 
during the post-SFAS 131 period.
 40, 41 
 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Costs of Capital Effects 
        If improved transparency lowers information asymmetry, then the increase in capital 
allocation efficiency observed after the adoption of SFAS 131 might have resulted from a 
reduction in the costs of capital instead of agency costs. A decrease in the costs of capital can 
lower the hurdle rate for new investments and therefore allow firms to undertake more capital 
expenditures in higher opportunity segments, thus increasing the efficiency of internal capital 
markets. To address this concern, I estimate Equation (1), including Cost of Capital as an 
additional control variable.
42
 Panel A of Table 5 shows that after controlling for Cost of 
Capital, the coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm remain significantly positive in both the 
full and constant samples in Columns 1 and 2 (one-sided p-values: 0.000 and 0.000, 
respectively).
43
 
                                                 
40
 The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 help with respect to identification. Whereas board independence and 
the number of segments (i.e., the moderating variables in Table 3) are strongly positively correlated with firm 
size, the takeover threat (i.e., the moderating variable in Table 4) is negatively correlated with firm size, 
ensuring that cross-sectional analyses do not merely capture the size effect.  
41
 An alternative proxy for managers’ incentives could be the CEO’s share ownership. However, the prediction 
is not clear. On the one hand, managers are likely to have stronger incentives to improve efficiency if they have 
higher ownership in their firms, because their wealth is more closely tied to the stock price. However, on the 
other hand, although shareholders can still price protect, such managers are likely to have more power to 
determine investments and may be willing to pay a price for inefficient internal capital markets. Online 
Appendix Table A6 reports the results of the cross-sectional analyses based on the CEO share ownership. It 
shows that the effect of SFAS 131 is more pronounced among change firms with CEOs having greater share 
ownership.   
42
 Similar to Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), I use the average of four different proxies for implied costs of capital, 
calculated using the models suggested by Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and 
Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). The Appendix details the estimation procedures for these four proxies. I 
do not include Cost of Capital as a control variable in the main analysis because the data requirement for the 
calculation of implied costs of capital reduces the sample size substantially.  
43
 The results based on a balanced panel show a positive coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm. However, this 
coefficient is not statistically significant, possibly due to the low power of the test, a result of the small sample 
size (untabulated). The requirement of the cost of capital measure reduces the size of the balanced sample to 128 
observations.  
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        Given that the proxy variable for costs of capital is subject to measurement errors, I 
conduct an alternative approach under which I investigate the source of efficiency 
improvement in the post-SFAS 132 period. The idea is that although any increase in 
investment in higher opportunity segments after the adoption of SFAS 131 is consistent with 
both the agency costs and costs of capital effects, a reduction in investment in lower 
opportunity segments (if I find such an effect) would be consistent only with the agency cost 
effect. For this purpose, I create a new variable for each firm that captures investment levels 
in lower opportunity segments, defined as the sum of segment capital expenditures scaled by 
the sum of segment assets reported in the segments classified as having lower opportunities 
(as described in Section 3.1). I then estimate Equation (1), replacing the dependent variable 
with this new variable. The results in Panel B of Table 5 show that the coefficients on Post 
131 × Change Firm are significantly negative in Columns 1-4 (one-sided p-values: 0.036, 
0.013, 0.029, and 0.013, respectively). These results suggest that improved efficiency in 
internal capital markets is at least partly due to improved monitoring, which likely induced 
managers to reduce inefficient investments in lower opportunity segments.
44
 
 
6.2. Compliant versus Noncompliant No-Change Firms  
        Despite the mandatory nature of the accounting standard, the control group may consist 
of two types of firms: 1) firms that had already adopted SFAS 131-type segment disclosures 
before the adoption of SFAS 131 (i.e., compliant no-change firms with already-transparent 
segment disclosure); and 2) firms that avoided improving disclosure transparency and 
decided not to comply with SFAS 131 because of the benefits and costs trade-off (i.e., 
noncompliant no-change firms with still-opaque segment disclosures). To the extent that the 
                                                 
44
 In an untabulated analysis, I find that the coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm is significantly positive for 
investment in higher opportunity segments, a result consistent with both the agency costs and costs of capital 
effects. 
30 
 
control group includes firms that strategically decided to remain no-change firms, the change 
versus no-change classification is less exogenous.  
        To distinguish between the two types of no-change firms, I rely on the proprietary cost 
hypothesis of the segment reporting literature, which suggests that firms are reluctant to 
reveal their “true” segments if such a revelation is likely to erode their competitive 
advantages (Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005). This literature predicts that firms with 
high proprietary costs are more likely to obscure segment disclosures and later be forced to 
change their segment definitions by adopting SFAS 131.
 
Given that proprietary costs capture 
managers’ incentives to obscure segment information, if firms with extremely high 
proprietary costs decided to remain no-change firms, it is more likely that they responded to 
SFAS 131 strategically, in contrast to no-change firms with relatively low proprietary costs.
45
 
        As an empirical proxy for proprietary costs, I use Li et al.’s (2012) measure of 
competition.
46
 More specifically, I classify a no-change firm as one with a higher likelihood 
of noncompliance if it belongs to the top quartile in a distribution of this measure of 
competition (averaged during the pre-SFAS 131 period). Excluding these firms, Table 6 
reports the results when the control group is composed of only a subset of no-change firms 
that were more likely to be compliant. Estimating Equation (1), the results show that the 
coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm are significantly positive in Columns 1-3 (one-sided 
p-values: 0.020, 0.012 and 0.068, respectively). Overall, Table 6 suggests that the results are 
                                                 
45
 If the motive to remain a no-change firm is to hide a firm’s segments with poorer opportunities (i.e., the 
agency costs motive), then capital allocation would appear to be more efficient than it actually is, creating a bias 
against my findings. 
46
 By counting the number of references to competition in a firm’s 10-K filing (relative to the total number of 
words in the document), this measure captures the threat of competition, as perceived by managers, which the 
firm would suffer if its proprietary information were revealed to competitors. The mean of this variable is 0.76 
for change firms and 0.71 for no-change firms in my sample, indicating that change and no-change firms on 
average refer to competition 0.76 and 0.71 times per thousand words in their filings, respectively. This result is 
consistent with the literature’s prediction that firms with higher proprietary costs enjoyed more discretion in 
aggregating segments before the adoption of SFAS 131 and were later forced to become change firms. I thank 
Feng Li for sharing his competition data at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/. 
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robust to an additional sampling restriction that excludes no-change firms whose motives to 
remain no-change firms were more likely to be strategic.
47
 
 
6.3. Analyses Based on Segment Profitability  
        The measure of capital allocation efficiency used in this study relies on Tobin’s q and is 
prone to measurement errors (Whited 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips 2002). To mitigate this 
concern, in Table 7, I present a set of results of an additional analysis that focuses on segment 
profits as an outcome variable. More specifically, I investigate whether change firms were 
more likely to divest segments with lower profitability (measured before divestiture) or to 
acquire segments with higher profitability (measured after acquisition) during the period 
following SFAS 131 adoption.  
        To identify segments divested or acquired during the pre-SFAS 131 period, I compare 
segments reported in the last year under SFAS 14 (i.e., the lag adoption year; year t-1) to 
those reported the year before (i.e., year t-2). If a segment was reported the year before (i.e., 
year t-2) but not during the last year (i.e., year t-1), I assume that the segment was divested. 
In contrast, if a segment was not reported in the year before the last year (i.e., year t-2) but 
was reported in the last year under SFAS 14 (i.e., year t-1), I assume that the segment was 
acquired.
48
 Similarly, I compare segments reported in the first year under SFAS 131 (i.e., the 
adoption year; year t+1) to those reported in the year after the first year (i.e., year t+2) to 
identify segments divested or acquired during the post-SFAS 131 period. I then define a new 
variable, Profit Diff, for segment j of firm i in year t as follows: 
                                                 
47
 I obtain similar results when I use Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford’s (2005) proxies for proprietary 
costs. Note that their proxies capture the potential loss of profits that firms would suffer if disclosures of certain 
operations (currently characterized as lower competition) were to attract more entrants. In contrast, the measure 
of competition used by Li et al. (2012) captures a broader threat of competition from new and existing rivals. If 
some of the no-change firms were noncompliant with SFAS 131, it would be problematic to use Harris (1998) 
and Botosan and Stanford’s (2005) competition measures to proxy for proprietary costs because the measures 
are calculated on the basis of industry characteristics of “untrue” segment data.  
48
 Although SFAS 131 reduces managers’ discretion in defining reported segments, I acknowledge that this 
approach may reflect a firm’s discretionary reporting changes, failing to capture true acquisitions or divestitures. 
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Profit Diffijt =            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
where        is the ROA for segment j of firm i in year t;    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ it is the corresponding asset-
weighted average ROA of firm i’s remaining segments (excluding segment j) in year t; and 
  equals (-1) if segment j is divested, equals (+1) if segment j is acquired, and is assigned a 
missing value if segment j is neither divested nor acquired.49 
 
Profit Diff measures the extent to which firms divest segments with lower profitability or 
acquire segments with higher profitability.
50
 However, SFAS 131 does not define segment 
profits, and each firm is allowed to define segment profits in its own way. Therefore, segment 
profits are not comparable across firms, potentially increasing the noise of this measure. In an 
effort to reduce this noise, I define an indicator variable, Profit Diff [0, 1], which takes a 
value of one if Profit Diff takes a positive value and zero otherwise.   
        Panel A of Table 7 shows that the mean of Profit Diff [0, 1] is 0.2632 for change firms 
during the pre-SFAS 131 period, suggesting that 26% of the 38 segments identified either as 
divested or acquired reported lower (higher) profitability in cases of divestiture (acquisition) 
relative to other segments of the same firm. This figure rises to 0.4246 in the post-SFAS 131 
period, an increase that is statistically significant (two-sided p-value: 0.0651). In contrast, for 
no-change firms, the means of Profit Diff [0, 1] are 0.5263 and 0.4273 in the pre- and post-
SFAS 131 periods, respectively, a difference that is not statistically significant. A univariate 
                                                 
49
 Segment ROA is defined as the segment operating profit plus depreciation, scaled by the segment asset. To 
maximize the number of useable observations, I assign depreciation a value of zero when it is missing, as in 
Berger and Hann (2007). The inferences remain the same when I define segment ROA as the segment operating 
profit scaled by the segment asset.  
50
 For example, for acquired segments, Profit Diff is calculated as the ROA of the acquired segments minus the 
asset-weighted average ROA of other segments of the same firm using the financial data after the segment was 
acquired. Profit Diff then takes a positive value if the acquired segments report higher ROA than other segments 
of the same firm. In contrast, for divested segments, Profit Diff is calculated as the ROA of the divested 
segments minus the asset-weighted average ROA of other segments of the same firm, the whole multiplied by (-
1), using the financial data before the segment was divested. Thus, Profit Diff takes a positive value if the firm 
divested its segments with lower profitability. 
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difference-in-differences test of these mean values produces a significantly positive result of 
0.2605 (one-sided p-value: 0.014), suggesting that following the adoption of SFAS 131, 
change firms increased their tendency either to divest segments with lower profitability or to 
acquire segments with higher profitability to a greater extent than did no-change firms.
51
 The 
results are similar in Panel B of Table 7, which presents the means of Profit Diff.
 
 
        Panel C of Table 7 reports the results of multivariate analyses based on segment 
profitability using a sample of segments divested or acquired. The control variables include a 
set of firm characteristics that are believed correlated with a firm’s decision to divest or 
acquire segments. They also include segment characteristics identified as affecting a firm’s 
reporting choices upon adopting SFAS 131. Note that firm-fixed effects are not feasible in 
these analyses because firms with multiple divestitures or acquisitions over the sample period 
are infrequent. In Column 1, I estimate a Probit model using Profit Diff [0, 1] as the 
dependent variable. In Column 2, I estimate an OLS regression using Profit Diff as the 
dependent variable. The results show that in both Columns 1 and 2, the coefficients on Post 
131 × Change Firm are significantly positive (one-sided p-values: 0.000 and 0.040, 
respectively), consistent with the results reported in Table 2.
52, 53
         
 
6.4. Other Tests 
                                                 
51
 Also of interest is the significant difference in Profit Diff [0, 1] between the two groups during the pre-SFAS 
131 period. This result is in line with the observation presented in Panel A of Table 1, which suggests that 
change firms that obscured segment information before the adoption of SFAS 131 allocated capital less 
efficiently than no-change firms during the pre-SFAS 131 period. However, this difference disappeared during 
the post-SFAS 131 period. 
52
 The number of observations used in the Probit model decreases substantially (in Column 1) because given that 
industry-fixed effects are applied, firms should exhibit variation in the binary dependent variable within 
industries to contribute to the estimation. Otherwise, they are dropped from the estimation. The industry-fixed 
effect also reduces the sample size slightly in the OLS regression (in Column 2) because some segments do not 
report segment SIC codes. Without industry-fixed effects, the coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm are still 
significantly positive in both Columns 1 and 2.  
53
 To carry out an analysis based on segment profitability with firm-fixed effects, I examine whether change 
firms were more likely to undertake more (less) investments (i.e., capital expenditures) in segments with higher 
(lower) profitability after the adoption of SFAS 131 and find consistent results. See Online Appendix Table A7 
for detailed procedures and results. 
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        An alternative explanation of my findings is that an increase in proprietary costs with the 
adoption of SFAS 131 might have induced change firms to invest more in their promising 
segments (previously hidden) to deter competitors from entering their business (Dixit 1980). 
To address this concern, I run the regressions while controlling for levels and changes in 
capital expenditures. In addition, Panel B of Table 5 reports that change firms reduced their 
inefficient investments after the adoption of SFAS 131, a result that is consistent with the 
agency story but not predicted by the Dixit (1980) story. Finally, I conduct an additional 
cross-sectional analysis, using Li et al.’s (2012) measure of competition as a proxy for 
proprietary costs.
 
If the alternative explanation were true, I would observe a stronger effect of 
SFAS 131 for change firms facing higher proprietary costs of disclosures. However, I find no 
such evidence.
54
  
        Another possibility that may have driven my results is a mean reversion of capital 
allocation efficiency. To address this concern, I impose a sampling restriction in which I 
match change firms with no-change firms based on their pre-SFAS 131 capital allocation 
efficiency. This procedure results in a restricted sample in which change and no-change firms 
do not differ in terms of their capital allocation efficiency during the pre-SFAS 131 period. 
Using this restricted sample, I estimate Equation (1) and find a significantly positive 
coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm, suggesting that my results are not driven by a mean 
reversion of capital allocation efficiency.
55
     
        I also employ the propensity score matching (PSM) method. While firm and segment 
characteristics are already controlled for in linear regressions, the PSM method has the 
advantage of not assuming any functional form. The regression under PSM confirms that the 
coefficient on Post 131 × Change Firm is significantly positive and does not diverge much 
                                                 
54
 Online Appendix Table A8 reports the results of this analysis.  
55
 Online Appendix Table A9 details the matching procedure and reports the results of this analysis.  
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from the results reported in Panel A of Table 2, mitigating the concern that time-variant 
observables may drive my results.
56
   
        Finally, I adopt two alternative measures of internal capital market (ICM) efficiency 
used in prior studies. The first measure is the adjusted investment ratio developed by Rajan et 
al. (2000). This measure captures differences in investments between a segment of a 
diversified firm and its stand-alone peers operating in the same industry.
 
The second measure 
is based on excess capital expenditures. Defined as Max [segment capital expenditures – 
segment cash flows, 0], excess capital expenditures represent a portion of the segment’s 
investments subsidized by other segments and/or external financing (Billett and Mauer 2003; 
Berger and Hann 2007). Using these alternative measures of ICM efficiency, I find consistent 
results.
57
         
 
7. Conclusion  
        Using the adoption of SFAS 131, this study examines the effect of segment disclosure 
transparency on internal capital market efficiency. Consistent with SFAS 131 improving the 
monitoring of managers (Berger and Hann 2003), I find that a group of diversified firms that 
improved segment disclosure transparency upon adoption of SFAS 131 (“change firms”) 
experienced a greater improvement in capital allocation efficiency than did a control sample 
of diversified firms that did not (“no-change firms”). In addition, I find that observed 
improvements in capital allocation efficiency were greater for change firms monitored by less 
independent boards of directors and enjoying more diversified internal capital markets during 
the pre-SFAS 131 period. I also find that the effect is greater for change firms whose 
managers faced greater threats of takeover during the post-SFAS 131 period.
58
 
                                                 
56
 Online Appendix Table A10 details the matching procedure and reports the results of this analysis.   
57
 Online Appendix Table A11 details variable measurement and reports the results of this analysis. 
58
 The effect of SFAS 131 on firm value is not clear. On the one hand, change firms could achieve higher value 
if SFAS 131 reduced agency costs and improved internal capital market efficiency (as documented in this study). 
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        This study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the 
strand of accounting literature that seeks to link accounting quality to investment efficiency. 
More specifically, this study is among the first to establish a link between disclosure quality 
and internal capital markets. Second, whereas previous studies have obtained mixed results 
regarding whether diversification destroys firm value, this study contributes to the internal 
capital market literature in finance and management by demonstrating the role played by the 
disclosure transparency of segment information. Finally, this study contributes to a stream of 
accounting studies on segment disclosure. The results of this study indicate that SFAS 131 
has accomplished its stated goal of providing investors with better information regarding how 
diversified firms operate their segments and how each segment performs (FASB 1997, para. 
3-8).
 
 
        This study is subject to the following limitations. First, the key assumption of this study 
is that the assignment to change versus no-change firms is exogenous. For my research 
design and identification strategy to work, it must be assumed that a firm’s reporting decision 
in light of SFAS 131 does not result from strategic considerations occasioned by proprietary 
cost incentives. Additionally, it must be assumed that the decision is not a function of shocks 
to a firm’s growth opportunities. Although this study conducts several tests to alleviate this 
concern, to the extent that the assumption of exogeneity does not hold, my results could be 
biased. Second, the measure of capital allocation efficiency used in this study is subject to 
measurement errors. For example, this measure focuses on capital expenditures as the major 
component of investment expenditures and assumes that firms are not capital-constrained. It 
also relies on Tobin’s q as a proxy for growth opportunities. Although a battery of sensitivity 
tests mitigates concerns about measurement errors, the findings of this study should be 
interpreted with that caveat in mind.  
                                                                                                                                                        
On the other hand, however, change firms could suffer a value decline if SFAS 131 revealed proprietary 
segment information to competitors.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Capital Allocation Efficiency is the asset-weighted average of the Signed CAPX deviation. 
The Signed CAPX deviation is (+1) × CAPX deviation if the segment q is greater than its 
sibling segments’ asset-weighted average q, and (-1) × CAPX deviation if the segment q is 
not greater than its sibling segments’ asset-weighted average q. The CAPX deviation is 
defined as [the ratio of segment capital expenditures to firm capital expenditures – the ratio of 
segment sales to firm sales]. 
 
Log(Mktval) is the log-transformed market value of equity.   
 
MTB is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity  
 
Cash Flows is the operating cash flows scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets. 
 
CAPEX is the capital expenditures scaled by the net PP&E. 
 
CAPEX Change is the percentage change in capital expenditures from the previous to 
current years. 
 
NonCAPEX is an indicator variable that equals one for firms reporting positive amounts of 
R&Ds or intangibles and zero otherwise. 
 
Tangibility is the net PP&E scaled by the total assets. 
 
External Financing is the net external financing divided by the capital expenditures. The net 
external financing is defined as [(sale of common and preferred stock + long-term debt 
issuance) – (purchase of common and preferred stock + long-term debt reduction) + any 
current debt changes – dividend]. 
 
Cash is the sum of cash and cash equivalents scaled by the total assets. 
 
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to the total assets.  
 
Dividend is an indicator variable that equals one for firms reporting positive amounts of 
dividends for common stocks and zero otherwise. 
 
Board Independence is the proportion of outside directors on the board who are unaffiliated 
with the firm (measured at the beginning of the year). The decile rank of this variable is used 
as a control variable in regression analyses. To measure this variable, I use data on officers 
and boards of directors collected from Compact Disclosure’s June CD-ROMs. Because the 
boards of directors data cover only a small fraction of firms in the sample, if a firm’s board 
information is not available in a particular year, I substitute data from the closest previous or 
subsequent year to maximize the number of usable observations. 
 
Number of Segments is the number of business segments. 
 
Segment Profit Variability is the range of segment ROA (i.e., the highest segment ROA – 
the lowest segment ROA).  
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Segment Industry Diversity is the ratio of the number of segments with unique two-digit 
SIC codes to the total number of segments.  
 
Speed of Profit Adjustment is the asset-weighted average of the speed of profit adjustment 
in the industries in which the firm’s segments operate (based on each segment’s two-digit SIC 
code). The speed of profit adjustment is calculated by estimating the following equation in 
each industry over the prior 20-year period: 
ijtijtpjijtnjjijt XDXDX    )()( 12110 ,  
where Xijt is the difference between firm i’s ROA and the median ROA for its two-digit 
industry j in year t. Dn is equal to one if Xijt-1 is not positive and zero otherwise. Dp is equal to 
one if Xijt-1 is positive and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as the ratio of the earnings before 
interest and taxes to the beginning-of-period total assets. The slope coefficient, β2j, captures 
the speed of profit adjustment in industry j. 
 
Concentration Ratio is the asset-weighted average of the Herfindahl index of the industries 
in which the firm’s segments operate (based on each segment’s two-digit SIC code). The decile 
rank of this variable is used as a control variable in regression analyses. The Herfindahl index 
in each industry is calculated as  
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where sijt is business i’s sales in industry j in year t and n is the number of businesses in 
industry j. “Business” refers to segments for multiple-segment firms and to firms for single-
segment firms. 
 
Segment Earnings Persistence is the asset-weighted average of the persistence of abnormal 
earnings in the industries in which the firm’s segments operate (based on each segment’s two-
digit SIC code). The decile rank of this variable is used as a control variable in regression 
analyses. The persistence of abnormal earnings is calculated by estimating the following 
equation in each industry over the prior 20-year period: 
ijtijtjjijt XX   110 , 
where Xijt is the difference between firm i’s ROA and the median ROA for its two-digit 
industry j in year t. The slope coefficient, β1j, captures the persistence of abnormal earnings in 
industry j. 
 
Cost of Capital is the average of four different proxies for implied costs of capital, i.e., 
                      , from the models suggested by Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt 
et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004), respectively. I obtain stock 
prices, shares outstanding, indicated annual dividend per share, and analyst earnings per share 
forecasts from the IBES Summary Database. All of the estimates are mean analyst consensus 
forecasts. For an observation to be included in the calculation, I require current stock price 
data (P0) and analyst earnings per share forecast data for two periods ahead (FEPS1 and 
FEPS2), and either forecasted earnings per share for period t+3 (FEPS3) or an estimate of the 
five-year growth (5YRG). In cases where 5YRG is missing and FEPS3 is not missing, I 
assume that 5YRG = (FEPS3 / FEPS2) – 1. I also assume that 5YRG cannot exceed 100%. If 
any of FEPS3, FEPS4, or FEPS5 is missing, I use the following relation: FEPSt = FEPSt-1 * (1 
+ 5YRG). I use only positive earnings forecasts and positive growth rates. In addition, 
dividend (DIV) is set equal to a constant fraction of FEPS, i.e.,            , where   is 
the average of the most recent three years’ payout ratio. I calculate the payout ratio as the 
indicated annual dividend per share (from the IBES Actual Database) divided by the actual 
39 
 
earnings per share (from the IBES Actual Database). If the indicated annual dividend is 
missing, I assume that it is zero. If the actual earnings per share are not positive, then I 
assume that it is 6% of the total assets per share following Gebhardt et al. (2001). I Winsorize 
the payout ratios to lie between zero and one. I use the following formulas to calculate each 
proxy for the implied costs of capital. 
 
Claus and Thomas (2001): 
        ∑       
  
   
   
                         
         
                       
 
This model uses actual book values per share and forecasted earnings per share up to five 
years ahead to calculate the expected future residual incomes for the five-year period. g is the 
growth rate proxied for by the (annualized) median of one-year-ahead realized monthly 
inflation rates (i.e., percentage change in monthly consumer price index). g is assumed not to 
exceed the cost of capital estimates. I assume a clean surplus for the book value of equity per 
share (BV), i.e.,                     . 
  
Gebhardt et al. (2001): 
        ∑        
  
    
   
                                
                        
 
This model uses actual book values per share and forecasted earnings per share up to three 
years ahead to calculate the expected future residual incomes for an initial three-year period. 
After the explicit forecast period of three years, residual incomes are estimated using linear 
interpolation, where the ROEs after the third year are assumed to mean-revert to the median 
industry ROE (i.e., target ROE).  To calculate the median industry ROE, I first define ROE as 
the earnings per share (from the IBES actual database) divided by the beginning book value 
per share. And for each firm, I calculate the average of the most recent three years’ ROEs 
based on a sample of firms with positive ROEs. Finally, I obtain the median of the average 
ROEs in each Fama-French 48 industry. In cases where the median industry ROE is not 
available, the target ROE is assumed to be the median ROE in the year. I assume a clean 
surplus for the book value of equity per share (BV), i.e.,                    . 
 
Gode and Mohanram (2003): 
       √                                          
 
This model uses one-year-ahead forecasted earnings and dividends per share as well as 
forecasts of short- and long-term abnormal earnings growth. The short-term growth rate     is 
estimated as the average between the forecasted percentage change in earnings from year t+1 
to t+2 (i.e, FEPS2/FEPS1 – 1) and the five-year growth forecast provided by financial analysts 
in the IBES database (i.e., 5YRG). In cases where FEPS2 < FEPS1,     is estimated simply as 
5YRG. The short-term growth rate     is assumed to be the same as the inflation rate, which 
is proxied for by the (annualized) median of one-year-ahead percentage change in the 
monthly consumer price index. 
 
Easton (2004): 
         √                                
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This model uses one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per share forecasts as well as 
the expected dividends per share in period t+1.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics in the pre- and post-
SFAS 131 period samples separately. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the aggregate 
sample. Panel C reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for the aggregate sample. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. To avoid potential problems with outliers, all continuous 
variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. In Panel C, parenthesized numbers 
in the first column and row represent variable names as follows: (1) Capital Allocation Efficiency, (2) 
Log(Mktval), (3) MTB, (4) Cash Flows, (5) CAPEX, (6) CAPEX Change, (7) NonCAPEX, (8) 
Tangibility, (9) External Financing, (10) Cash Holding, (11) Leverage, (12)  Dividend, (13) Board 
Independence, (14) Number of Segments, (15) Segment Profit Variability, (16) Segment Industry 
Diversity, (17) Speed of Profit Adjustment, (18) Concentration Ratio, (19) Segment Earnings 
Persistence. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 1 - Continued 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics in the Pre- and Post-SFAS 131 Periods 
  Pre-SFAS 131 Period   Post-SFAS 131 Period     
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
 
Change  No-Change  
Difference  
Change  No-Change  
Difference  Diff. in Diff. 
 
Firms Firms 
 
Firms Firms 
 
 
(N=362) (N=310) 
 
(N=413) (N=306) 
   Mean Mean Diff. t-stat. 
 
Mean Mean Diff. t-stat. 
 
Diff. t-stat. 
Capital Allocation Efficiency -0.0162 0.0122 -0.0285 -1.98 
 
0.0079 -0.0018 0.0096 0.65 
 
0.0381 1.88 
Log(Mktval) 19.6841 19.8023 -0.1182 -0.74 
 
19.5200 19.6252 -0.1052 -0.67 
 
0.0129 0.06 
MTB 2.7865 2.9375 -0.1510 -0.66 
 
2.7342 2.3715 0.3627 1.56 
 
0.5137 1.55 
Cash Flows 0.0878 0.0947 -0.0069 -0.85 
 
0.0777 0.0914 -0.0137 -1.69 
 
-0.0068 -0.59 
CAPEX 0.2544 0.2284 0.0260 2.54 
 
0.2507 0.2128 0.0378 3.80 
 
0.0118 0.81 
CAPEX Change 0.4087 0.4247 -0.0159 -0.21 
 
0.2999 0.2085 0.0915 1.41 
 
0.1074 1.09 
NonCAPEX 0.8122 0.8226 -0.0104 -0.35 
 
0.8450 0.8464 -0.0014 -0.05 
 
0.0091 0.22 
Tangibility 0.2902 0.3334 -0.0432 -2.83 
 
0.2906 0.3190 -0.0284 -1.85 
 
0.0148 0.69 
External Financing 2.5726 1.7629 0.8098 1.37 
 
2.5481 1.8672 0.6809 1.23 
 
-0.1289 -0.16 
Cash Holding 0.0792 0.0649 0.0143 1.90 
 
0.0853 0.0731 0.0122 1.42 
 
-0.0020 -0.17 
Leverage 0.5135 0.5379 -0.0244 -1.70 
 
0.5330 0.5501 -0.0172 -1.18 
 
0.0072 0.35 
Dividend 0.5000 0.6194 -0.1194 -3.12 
 
0.4600 0.5850 -0.1249 -3.33 
 
-0.0056 -0.10 
Board Independence 0.6920 0.7177 -0.0257 -1.83 
 
0.6917 0.7029 -0.0112 -0.79 
 
0.0146 0.72 
Number of Segments 3.0691 2.9710 0.0981 1.12 
 
3.2034 2.9346 0.2687 3.13 
 
0.1707 1.39 
Segment Profit Variability 0.3623 0.2647 0.0977 2.48 
 
0.4158 0.3176 0.0983 2.31 
 
0.0006 0.01 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.7906 0.8589 -0.0683 -3.82 
 
0.7979 0.8672 -0.0694 -4.18 
 
-0.0011 -0.04 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.5010 0.4701 0.0308 1.65 
 
0.5248 0.4842 0.0406 2.24 
 
0.0098 0.38 
Concentration Ratio 0.0660 0.0612 0.0048 1.35 
 
0.1090 0.1073 0.0017 0.24 
 
-0.0031 -0.40 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.7228 0.8619 -0.1391 -2.10   0.6650 0.7528 -0.0878 -1.89   0.0513 0.66 
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Table 1 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Aggregate Sample  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Change Firms 
 
No-Change Firms 
 
Difference 
  N  Mean   N  Mean   Diff.  t-stat. 
Capital Allocation Efficiency 775 -0.0034 
 
616 0.0053 
 
-0.0087 -0.84 
Log(Mktval) 775 19.5966 
 
616 19.7143 
 
-0.1177 -1.05 
MTB 775 2.7586 
 
616 2.6563 
 
0.1023 0.62 
Cash Flows 775 0.0824 
 
616 0.0930 
 
-0.0106 -1.86 
CAPEX 775 0.2524 
 
616 0.2207 
 
0.0318 4.43 
CAPEX Change 775 0.3507 
 
616 0.3173 
 
0.0335 0.68 
NonCAPEX 775 0.8297 
 
616 0.8344 
 
-0.0047 -0.23 
Tangibility 775 0.2904 
 
616 0.3262 
 
-0.0358 -3.31 
External Financing 775 2.5595 
 
616 1.8147 
 
0.7449 1.85 
Cash Holding 775 0.0825 
 
616 0.0690 
 
0.0135 2.36 
Leverage 775 0.5239 
 
616 0.5440 
 
-0.0201 -1.98 
Dividend 775 0.4787 
 
616 0.6023 
 
-0.1236 -4.62 
Board Independence 775 0.6918 
 
616 0.7103 
 
-0.0185 -1.86 
Number of Segments 775 3.1406 
 
616 2.9529 
 
0.1877 3.06 
Segment Profit Variability 775 0.3908 
 
616 0.2909 
 
0.0999 3.44 
Segment Industry Diversity 775 0.7945 
 
616 0.8630 
 
-0.0686 -5.65 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 775 0.5137 
 
616 0.4771 
 
0.0366 2.81 
Concentration Ratio 775 0.0889 
 
616 0.0841 
 
0.0048 1.18 
Segment Earnings Persistence 775 0.6920   616 0.8077   -0.1157 -2.88 
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Table 1 - Continued 
 
Panel C: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Aggregate Sample  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(2) -0.014 
                 
(3) 0.051 0.321 
                
(4) -0.050 0.283 -0.013 
               
(5) 0.001 -0.102 0.077 -0.063 
              
(6) 0.016 -0.069 0.043 -0.044 0.433 
             
(7) 0.002 0.128 0.077 0.002 -0.038 -0.006 
            
(8) -0.041 0.141 -0.029 0.217 -0.243 -0.079 -0.144 
           
(9) 0.011 -0.073 0.076 -0.282 -0.054 0.078 0.056 -0.197 
          
(10) 0.040 -0.155 0.129 -0.129 0.238 0.075 0.019 -0.261 0.130 
         
(11) 0.006 0.218 0.135 -0.015 -0.216 -0.073 0.032 0.113 0.023 -0.391 
        
(12) -0.004 0.478 0.064 0.235 -0.213 -0.134 0.007 0.160 -0.125 -0.283 0.240 
       
(13) -0.029 0.307 0.081 0.065 -0.106 -0.056 0.151 0.055 -0.074 -0.138 0.181 0.220 
      
(14) -0.061 0.366 0.038 0.049 -0.056 -0.062 0.029 0.050 -0.076 -0.141 0.231 0.210 0.121 
     
(15) 0.028 -0.137 0.135 -0.125 0.142 0.022 -0.043 -0.062 0.054 0.125 -0.105 -0.140 -0.047 0.168 
    
(16) 0.020 0.086 0.032 0.003 -0.066 -0.021 0.067 -0.059 0.017 -0.085 0.063 0.156 0.070 -0.110 -0.037 
   
(17) 0.003 -0.047 0.022 -0.065 -0.059 -0.069 -0.037 -0.028 -0.027 0.027 -0.071 -0.024 0.072 -0.066 -0.016 0.013 
  
(18) 0.027 0.023 -0.027 0.016 0.027 -0.062 -0.086 0.079 -0.046 -0.042 0.052 0.031 -0.052 0.126 0.106 0.000 -0.141 
 
(19) 0.010 0.040 -0.008 0.122 0.052 0.035 -0.113 0.346 -0.054 -0.042 -0.035 -0.089 -0.023 0.023 -0.057 -0.027 -0.264 0.012 
50 
 
Table 2 Analyses of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the regression of Capital Allocation Efficiency. Panel A reports the 
results when Capital Allocation Efficiency is measured based on segment sales. Panel B reports the 
results when Capital Allocation Efficiency is measured based on segment sales normalized according 
to segments’ industry capital intensities. In both Panels A and B, Column 1 reports the results from 
the full sample, Column 2 reports the results from the constant sample, and Column 3 reports the 
results from the balanced sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. To avoid potential 
problems with outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by clustering industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and 
year because aggregate macroeconomic and industry demand shocks may induce some correlations 
with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Statistical significance is assessed by using one-sided p-values for variables with 
signed predictions and two-sided p-values otherwise. 
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Table 2 - Continued 
 
Panel A: Regression Results of Capital Allocation Efficiency  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0027 0.13 
 
-0.0033 -0.17 
 
-0.0324 -0.71 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0364*** 2.83 
 
0.0363*** 2.85 
 
0.0760** 2.06 
Log(Mktval) 0.0338 1.56 
 
0.0364* 1.84 
 
0.0436* 1.93 
MTB 0.0016 0.32 
 
0.0007 0.16 
 
0.0022 0.38 
Cash Flows 0.0934 1.46 
 
0.1232* 1.72 
 
0.2083 1.23 
CAPEX 0.1019 0.87 
 
0.1440 1.34 
 
0.0897 0.41 
CAPEX Change -0.0161 -1.42 
 
-0.0158 -1.31 
 
-0.0282 -1.30 
NonCAPEX -0.0125 -0.17 
 
0.0013 0.02 
 
-0.0335 -0.25 
Tangibility 0.0036 0.02 
 
-0.0385 -0.22 
 
-0.0477 -0.24 
External Financing -0.0006 -1.07 
 
-0.0003 -0.56 
 
-0.0001 -0.15 
Cash Holding -0.1498 -1.00 
 
-0.1695 -1.19 
 
-0.0927 -0.41 
Leverage 0.1635** 2.55 
 
0.1250*** 2.67 
 
0.4224*** 3.17 
Dividend 0.0373 0.75 
 
0.0292 0.56 
 
-0.0977 -1.64 
Board Independence -0.0049 -0.42 
 
-0.0053 -0.34 
 
0.0088 0.52 
Number of Segments -0.0027 -0.19 
 
-0.0014 -0.10 
 
0.0067 0.30 
Segment Profit Variability -0.0101 -0.52 
 
-0.0088 -0.45 
 
-0.0093 -0.25 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.0418 0.43 
 
0.0467 0.49 
 
0.0907 1.42 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0285 0.23 
 
0.0955 0.73 
 
0.1843 1.47 
Concentration Ratio 0.0054 0.79 
 
0.0078 1.13 
 
0.0008 0.08 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0024 0.34 
 
0.0060 0.90 
 
0.0060 0.54 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,391 
 
1,147 
 
468 
Adj. R
2
 0.3426   0.3245   0.2258 
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Table 2 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Regression Results of Capital Allocation Efficiency Adjusted for Industry Capital Intensity 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 -0.0032 -0.12 
 
-0.0134 -0.53 
 
-0.0451 -0.89 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0399** 2.27 
 
0.0405** 2.31 
 
0.0669** 1.68 
Log(Mktval) 0.0344* 1.72 
 
0.0367** 2.02 
 
0.0463* 1.67 
MTB 0.0012 0.29 
 
0.0002 0.04 
 
0.0013 0.25 
Cash Flows 0.1075 1.58 
 
0.1316 1.48 
 
0.1309 1.37 
CAPEX 0.0806 0.73 
 
0.1057 1.07 
 
0.0468 0.29 
CAPEX Change -0.0119 -0.95 
 
-0.0127 -0.95 
 
-0.0172 -0.78 
NonCAPEX 0.0205 0.33 
 
0.0352 0.54 
 
0.0171 0.16 
Tangibility 0.1180 0.59 
 
0.0893 0.49 
 
0.1696 0.82 
External Financing -0.0003 -0.73 
 
0.0000 -0.07 
 
0.0001 0.10 
Cash Holding -0.1159 -0.78 
 
-0.1214 -0.86 
 
0.0950 0.47 
Leverage 0.2110*** 2.68 
 
0.1792*** 2.62 
 
0.4223*** 2.83 
Dividend 0.0373 0.66 
 
0.0309 0.52 
 
-0.0667 -1.42 
Board Independence 0.0010 0.08 
 
-0.0004 -0.02 
 
0.0018 0.10 
Number of Segments -0.0155 -1.40 
 
-0.0151 -1.43 
 
-0.0232 -1.08 
Segment Profit Variability -0.0073 -0.42 
 
-0.0050 -0.30 
 
0.0252 0.66 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.1325 0.84 
 
0.1212 0.90 
 
0.2059 1.64 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0557 0.44 
 
0.1024 0.76 
 
0.1598 1.12 
Concentration Ratio 0.0008 0.19 
 
0.0032 0.67 
 
-0.0029 -0.38 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0001 0.01 
 
0.0023 0.40 
 
0.0017 0.18 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,391  1,147  468 
Adj. R
2
 0.3230  0.3162  0.1985 
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Table 3 Cross-Sectional Analyses - Role of Agency Costs 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis of Capital Allocation Efficiency, which 
focuses on the role of agency costs experienced by firms during the pre-SFAS 131 period. Panel A 
reports the results when agency costs are proxied for by the monitoring of boards of directors. Weak 
Board is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for firms weakly monitored by their boards 
of directors and zero otherwise. A firm is classified as having a weak board if the average proportion 
of independent directors on the board during the pre-SFAS 131 period is lower than its sample median. 
All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The total effect of SFAS 131 on change firms 
(relative to no-change firms) with Weak Board = 0 is captured by the coefficient on Post 131× 
Change Firm. The total effect of SFAS 131 on change firms (relative to no-change firms) with Weak 
Board = 1 is the sum of the coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm and Post 131 × Change Firm × 
Weak Board. Panel B reports the results when agency costs are proxied for by the extent of 
diversification. High Diversification is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for firms that 
reported more than two segments with unrelated operations on average during the pre-SFAS 131 
period and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The total effect of SFAS 
131 on change firms (relative to no-change firms) with High Diversification = 0 is captured by the 
coefficient on Post 131× Change Firm. The total effect of SFAS 131 on change firms (relative to no-
change firms) with High Diversification = 1 is the sum of the coefficients on Post 131 × Change Firm 
and Post 131 × Change Firm × High Diversification. In both Panels A and B, Column 1 reports the 
results from the full sample, Column 2 reports the results from the constant sample, and Column 3 
reports the results from the balanced sample. To avoid potential problems with outliers, all continuous 
variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by 
clustering industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and year because aggregate macroeconomic and 
industry demand shocks may induce some correlations with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Statistical 
significance is assessed by using one-sided p-values for variables with signed predictions and two-
sided p-values otherwise. 
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Table 3 - Continued 
Panel A: Results Based on Boards of Directors  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0225 0.95 
 
0.0192 0.78 
 
-0.0334 -0.88 
Post 131 × Change Firm  0.0006 0.05 
 
0.0002 0.03 
 
0.0477 1.40 
Post 131 × Weak Board -0.0480* -1.68 -0.0472* -1.76 -0.0052 -0.23 
Post 131 × Change Firm × Weak Board (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0728*** 2.40  0.0742*** 2.59  0.0592 1.17 
Log(Mktval) 0.0352* 1.78 
 
0.0362* 1.83 
 
0.0437* 1.96 
MTB 0.0017 0.37 
 
0.0007 0.16 
 
0.0019 0.33 
Cash Flows 0.1074* 1.75 
 
0.1199* 1.75 
 
0.2124 1.28 
CAPEX 0.1065 0.97 
 
0.1414 1.31 
 
0.0963 0.44 
CAPEX Change -0.0131 -1.09 
 
-0.0166 -1.38 
 
-0.0307 -1.35 
NonCAPEX -0.0055 -0.07 
 
0.0085 0.11 
 
-0.0297 -0.22 
Tangibility 0.0117 0.06 
 
-0.0388 -0.22 
 
-0.0438 -0.22 
External Financing -0.0004 -0.70 
 
-0.0003 -0.56 
 
-0.0002 -0.24 
Cash Holding -0.1132 -0.78 
 
-0.1569 -1.10 
 
-0.0641 -0.29 
Leverage 0.1676*** 3.43 
 
0.1297*** 2.63 
 
0.4262*** 3.19 
Dividend 0.0459 0.92 
 
0.0299 0.59 
 
-0.1104** -2.16 
Board Independence -0.0065 -0.42 
 
-0.0052 -0.34 
 
0.0067 0.39 
Number of Segments -0.0009 -0.07 
 
-0.0020 -0.15 
 
0.0054 0.25 
Segment Profit Variability -0.0099 -0.52 
 
-0.0078 -0.40 
 
-0.0102 -0.27 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.0553 0.61 
 
0.0583 0.61 
 
0.1035* 1.94 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0581 0.47 
 
0.0946 0.70 
 
0.1842 1.43 
Concentration Ratio 0.0071 0.99 
 
0.0080 1.17 
 
0.0014 0.15 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0046 0.62 
 
0.0060 0.87 
 
0.0057 0.50 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs.  1,246    1,147   468   
Adj. R
2
 0.3241  0.3264  0.2244 
Total Effect on Change Firms with Weak Board = 0  0.0006   0.0002   0.0477  
Total Effect on Change Firms with Weak Board = 1 0.0734***  0.0744***  0.1069* 
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Table 3 - Continued 
Panel B: Results Based on Diversification 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0223 0.86 
 
0.0192 0.77 
 
0.0151 0.32 
Post 131 × Change Firm  0.0039 0.31 
 
0.0044 0.33 
 
0.0160 0.63 
Post 131 × High Diversification -0.0840 -1.44 -0.0837 -1.44 -0.1626** -2.39 
Post 131 × Change Firm × High Diversification (Pred. Sign: +) 0.1251** 2.14  0.1248** 2.15  0.1933*** 2.70 
Log(Mktval) 0.0359* 1.74 
 
0.0369* 1.79 
 
0.0376 1.53 
MTB 0.0014 0.31 
 
0.0004 0.10 
 
0.0032 0.65 
Cash Flows 0.0965* 1.68 
 
0.1088* 1.68 
 
0.2011 1.32 
CAPEX 0.1095 1.00 
 
0.1446 1.34 
 
0.1226 0.65 
CAPEX Change -0.0118 -0.98 
 
-0.0152 -1.25 
 
-0.0296 -1.32 
NonCAPEX -0.0129 -0.18 
 
0.0006 0.01 
 
-0.0343 -0.27 
Tangibility -0.0007 0.00 
 
-0.0506 -0.28 
 
-0.1413 -0.67 
External Financing -0.0005 -0.83 
 
-0.0004 -0.69 
 
-0.0002 -0.29 
Cash Holding -0.1190 -0.82 
 
-0.1632 -1.15 
 
-0.0892 -0.36 
Leverage 0.1591*** 3.83 
 
0.1214*** 2.89 
 
0.4330*** 2.96 
Dividend 0.0509 1.01 
 
0.0358 0.71 
 
-0.1102* -1.74 
Board Independence -0.0066 -0.42 
 
-0.0052 -0.33 
 
0.0095 0.66 
Number of Segments -0.0039 -0.29 
 
-0.0050 -0.36 
 
0.0014 0.06 
Segment Profit Variability -0.0104 -0.54 
 
-0.0082 -0.42 
 
-0.0088 -0.28 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.0245 0.28 
 
0.0270 0.30 
 
0.0378 0.66 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0424 0.40 
 
0.0789 0.66 
 
0.1519 1.32 
Concentration Ratio 0.0059 0.82 
 
0.0068 0.97 
 
-0.0006 -0.07 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0042 0.57 
 
0.0056 0.82 
 
0.0052 0.48 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs.  1,246   1,147  468  
Adj. R
2
 0.3285  0.3309  0.2546 
Total Effect on Change Firms with High Diversification = 0 0.0039   0.0044   0.0160  
Total Effect on Change Firms with High Diversification = 1 0.1290**  0.1292**  0.2093*** 
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Table 4 Cross-Sectional Analyses - Role of Managers’ Incentives  
 
Table 4 reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis of Capital Allocation Efficiency, which 
focuses on the role of managers’ incentives to improve efficiency during the post-SFAS 131 period. 
Managers’ incentives are proxied for by Gompers et al.’s (2003) measure of takeover threats (i.e., the 
G index). High Threat is an indicator variable which takes a value of one for firms whose G index, 
averaged during the post-SFAS 131 period, is below 11.5 (i.e., the upper quartile of the sample 
distribution of the variable) and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The 
total effect of SFAS 131 on change firms (relative to no-change firms) with High Threat = 0 is 
captured by the coefficient on Post 131× Change Firm. The total effect of SFAS 131 on change firms 
(relative to no-change firms) with High Threat = 1 is the sum of the coefficients on Post 131 × 
Change Firm and Post 131 × Change Firm × High Threat. Column 1 reports the results from the full 
sample, Column 2 reports the results from the constant sample, and Column 3 reports the results from 
the balanced sample. To avoid potential problems with outliers, all continuous variables are 
Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by clustering 
industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and year because aggregate macroeconomic and industry 
demand shocks may induce some correlations with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Statistical significance is 
assessed by using one-sided p-values for variables with signed predictions and two-sided p-values 
otherwise. 
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Table 4 - Continued 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0513* 1.66 
 
0.0393 1.19 
 
-0.0392** -2.23 
Post 131 × Change Firm  -0.0383 -1.35 
 
-0.0374 -1.43 
 
0.0143 0.36 
Post 131 × High Threat -0.0567 -1.63 -0.0561* -1.69 -0.0166 -0.51 
Post 131 × Change Firm × High Threat (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0814** 1.86  0.0806** 1.97  0.1005** 1.78 
Log(Mktval) 0.0102 0.35 
 
0.0171 0.66 
 
0.0150 0.50 
MTB -0.0005 -0.08 
 
-0.0020 -0.32 
 
-0.0018 -0.67 
Cash Flows 0.0701 0.61 
 
0.1281 1.05 
 
0.1160 0.51 
CAPEX -0.0730 -0.64 
 
-0.0427 -0.38 
 
-0.0069 -0.03 
CAPEX Change 0.0081 0.65 
 
0.0063 0.51 
 
-0.0277 -1.37 
NonCAPEX -0.0614 -0.74 
 
-0.0531 -0.63 
 
-0.0728 -0.68 
Tangibility -0.1519 -0.81 
 
-0.1581 -0.88 
 
-0.1005 -0.41 
External Financing 0.0002 0.20 
 
0.0002 0.18 
 
0.0010 1.32 
Cash Holding -0.1645 -1.57 
 
-0.1446 -1.47 
 
-0.0181 -0.10 
Leverage 0.0583 0.63 
 
0.0972 1.29 
 
0.3780* 1.69 
Dividend 0.1026* 1.71 
 
0.0709 1.38 
 
-0.0656 -1.03 
Board Independence -0.0122 -1.22 
 
-0.0146 -1.04 
 
0.0114 1.14 
Number of Segments 0.0075 0.40 
 
0.0081 0.46 
 
-0.0068 -0.28 
Segment Profit Variability 0.0262 0.87 
 
0.0281 0.97 
 
0.1104*** 3.82 
Segment Industry Diversity -0.0576 -0.59 
 
-0.0164 -0.19 
 
0.0336 0.38 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0722 0.74 
 
0.0963 0.93 
 
0.1470 1.22 
Concentration Ratio 0.0103* 1.93 
 
0.0106* 1.91 
 
0.0016 0.17 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0080* 1.70 
 
0.0096** 2.50 
 
0.0076 0.88 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs.  809   715  316  
Adj. R
2
 0.3040  0.2892  0.1980 
Total Effect on Change Firms with High Threat = 0 -0.0383   -0.0374   0.0143  
Total Effect on Change Firms with High Threat = 1 0.0431***  0.0432***  0.1148*** 
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Table 5 Additional Analyses - Agency Cost versus Cost of Capital Effects 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the additional analyses, the purpose of which is to ensure that improved 
efficiency in internal capital markets was not solely driven by cost of capital effects. Panel A reports 
the results of the regression of Capital Allocation Efficiency, including Cost of Capital as an 
additional control variable. Column 1 reports the results from the full sample, and Column 2 reports 
the results from the constant sample. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel B reports the 
results of the regression of Investment in Lower Opportunity Segments. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
results from the full sample, without and with including Cost of Capital as an additional control 
variable, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from the constant sample, without and with 
including Cost of Capital as an additional control variable, respectively. The dependent variable is 
defined as the sum of segment capital expenditures scaled by the sum of segment assets reported in 
the segments classified as having lower opportunities. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
To avoid potential problems with outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorized at the first and 
ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by clustering industry (based on two-digit SIC 
codes) and year because aggregate macroeconomic and industry demand shocks may induce some 
correlations with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Statistical significance is assessed by using one-sided p-values 
for variables with signed predictions and two-sided p-values otherwise. 
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Table 5 - Continued 
 
Panel A: Controlling for Cost of Capital  
  (1)   (2) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 -0.0369 -1.27 
 
-0.0375 -1.42 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0570*** 3.37 
 
0.0522*** 3.46 
Log(Mktval) 0.0446 1.15 
 
0.0460 1.14 
MTB -0.0042 -0.40 
 
-0.0109 -1.18 
Cash Flows 0.2586* 1.75 
 
0.3385** 1.98 
CAPEX 0.1477 0.85 
 
0.1781 1.32 
CAPEX Change -0.0199 -1.23 
 
-0.0252** -2.11 
NonCAPEX 0.0306 0.78 
 
0.0577 1.60 
Tangibility 0.1767 0.52 
 
0.1070 0.38 
External Financing 0.0000 0.01 
 
0.0009 0.47 
Cash Holding -0.1837 -0.87 
 
-0.2835* -1.88 
Leverage 0.0443 0.45 
 
0.0349 0.32 
Dividend 0.1115 1.20 
 
0.0313 0.41 
Board Independence -0.0126 -1.29 
 
-0.0058 -0.22 
Number of Segments -0.0022 -0.08 
 
-0.0004 -0.02 
Segment Profit Variability 0.0198 0.70 
 
0.0481 1.25 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.0109 0.09 
 
0.0846 0.73 
Speed of Profit Adjustment -0.0368 -0.53 
 
-0.0361 -0.37 
Concentration Ratio 0.0104 1.26 
 
0.0120 1.30 
Segment Earnings Persistence -0.0015 -0.20 
 
0.0003 0.04 
Cost of Capital × Change Firm -0.3561 -1.42 
 
-0.6288 -1.63 
Cost of Capital × (1- Change Firm) 0.7373 1.20  0.4210 0.54 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 686  475 
Adj. R
2
 0.2199  0.1713 
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Table 5 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Investment in Lower Opportunity Segments  
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
w/o Cost of Capital 
 
w/ Cost of Capital 
 
w/o Cost of Capital 
 
w/ Cost of Capital 
 
Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0008 0.10 
 
-0.0001 -0.01 
 
0.0018 0.25 
 
0.0044 0.48 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: -) -0.0085** -1.81 
 
-0.0167** -2.25 
 
-0.0083** -1.91 
 
-0.0171** -2.26 
Log(Mktval) -0.0017 -0.28 
 
-0.0041 -1.03 
 
-0.0022 -0.41 
 
-0.0026 -0.38 
MTB 0.0000 0.07 
 
-0.0006 -0.31 
 
0.0002 0.26 
 
0.0005 0.34 
Cash Flows -0.0272 -1.47 
 
-0.042 -1.02 
 
-0.0258* -1.69 
 
-0.0532 -1.1 
CAPEX 0.2024*** 3.67 
 
0.2680*** 4.44 
 
0.1917*** 3.60 
 
0.2779*** 4.2 
CAPEX Change 0.0050 1.12 
 
0.0134 1.49 
 
0.0031 0.71 
 
0.0033 0.38 
NonCAPEX -0.0119 -0.72 
 
-0.0092 -0.41 
 
-0.0193 -1.37 
 
-0.0308 -1.63 
Tangibility 0.2793*** 3.85 
 
0.2647*** 2.78 
 
0.2800*** 4.44 
 
0.2349*** 2.91 
External Financing 0.0000 0.28 
 
0.0004 0.91 
 
0.0000 -0.18 
 
0.0001 0.46 
Cash Holding 0.0268 0.68 
 
0.0286 0.59 
 
0.0294 0.84 
 
0.01 0.32 
Leverage -0.0308 -0.95 
 
-0.0668** -2.58 
 
-0.0223 -0.77 
 
-0.0487 -1.56 
Dividend 0.0028 0.27 
 
-0.0059 -0.21 
 
-0.0003 -0.03 
 
-0.0079 -0.18 
Board Independence -0.0008 -0.36 
 
-0.0019 -0.49 
 
-0.0033* -1.91 
 
-0.0019 -0.3 
Number of Segments 0.0006 0.13 
 
0.0002 0.04 
 
-0.0006 -0.16 
 
-0.0006 -0.11 
Segment Profit Variability 0.0035 1.15 
 
0.0125 1.33 
 
0.0041 1.59 
 
0.0165 1.01 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.0054 0.10 
 
0.0222 0.55 
 
0.0009 0.02 
 
-0.0024 -0.06 
Speed of Profit Adjustment -0.0052 -0.15 
 
-0.0429 -1.24 
 
-0.0282 -1.05 
 
-0.0543 -1.38 
Concentration Ratio -0.0002 -0.17 
 
-0.001 -0.52 
 
-0.0007 -0.54 
 
-0.0009 -0.57 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0001 0.04 
 
-0.0023 -1.04 
 
-0.0009 -0.56 
 
-0.0027 -1.38 
Cost of Capital × Change Firm 
   
-0.0082 -0.1 
    
0.0539 0.37 
Cost of Capital × (1- Change Firm) 0.1404 1.23 0.2673** 2.05 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,391 
 
686 
 
1,147 
 
475 
Adj. R
2
 0.6439 0.6668 0.6483 0.6735 
61 
 
Table 6 Additional Analyses - Excluding No-Change Firms with Higher Likelihood of 
Noncompliance 
 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression of Capital Allocation Efficiency, in which the sample 
excludes a subset of no-change firms whose motives to remain no-change firms were more likely to 
be strategic. Column 1 reports the results from the full sample, Column 2 reports the results from the 
constant sample, and Column 3 reports the results from the balanced sample. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. To avoid potential problems with outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorized at 
the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by clustering industry (based on 
two-digit SIC codes) and year because aggregate macroeconomic and industry demand shocks may 
induce some correlations with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Statistical significance is assessed by using 
one-sided p-values for variables with signed predictions and two-sided p-values otherwise. 
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Table 6 - Continued 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Full Sample 
 
Constant Sample 
 
Balanced Sample 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 0.0065 0.25 
 
-0.0013 -0.05 
 
-0.0180 -0.28 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: +) 0.0305** 2.06 
 
0.0312** 2.30 
 
0.0595* 1.50 
Log(Mktval) 0.0363* 1.69 
 
0.0416** 2.13 
 
0.0407 1.57 
MTB -0.0015 -0.24 
 
-0.0035 -0.68 
 
0.0019 0.35 
Cash Flows 0.0661 1.00 
 
0.0818 1.08 
 
0.1371 0.75 
CAPEX 0.0752 0.53 
 
0.0994 0.77 
 
0.0365 0.14 
CAPEX Change -0.0135 -1.15 
 
-0.0120 -1.00 
 
-0.0241 -1.17 
NonCAPEX -0.0172 -0.20 
 
-0.0094 -0.11 
 
-0.0533 -0.37 
Tangibility -0.1394 -0.77 
 
-0.1428 -0.78 
 
-0.1914 -1.07 
External Financing -0.0010 -1.55 
 
-0.0007 -1.10 
 
-0.0008 -0.98 
Cash Holding -0.2237 -1.43 
 
-0.2160 -1.48 
 
-0.1297 -0.54 
Leverage 0.1414* 1.77 
 
0.1150* 1.84 
 
0.4764*** 3.53 
Dividend 0.0406 0.81 
 
0.0300 0.61 
 
-0.1036* -1.87 
Board Independence -0.0071 -0.61 
 
-0.0081 -0.52 
 
0.0102 0.68 
Number of Segments 0.0011 0.06 
 
0.0033 0.19 
 
0.0197 0.70 
Segment Profit Variability -0.0165 -1.16 
 
-0.0155 -1.04 
 
-0.0308 -1.05 
Segment Industry Diversity -0.0149 -0.14 
 
-0.0041 -0.04 
 
0.0036 0.04 
Speed of Profit Adjustment 0.0526 0.35 
 
0.1237 0.83 
 
0.2514 1.43 
Concentration Ratio 0.0039 0.54 
 
0.0061 0.85 
 
-0.0056 -0.55 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0036 0.50 
 
0.0083 1.26 
 
0.0075 0.68 
Firm Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,284  1,055  412 
Adj. R
2
 0.3309  0.3276  0.2477 
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Table 7 Additional Analyses - Analyses Based on Segment Profitability 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the analyses which investigate whether change firms were more likely to 
divest segments with lower profitability or to acquire segments with higher profitability after the 
adoption of SFAS 131. These analyses are based on 403 segments identified as either divested or 
acquired. For acquired segments, Profit Diff is calculated as the ROA of the acquired segments minus 
the asset-weighted average ROA of other segments of the same firm using the financial data after the 
segment was acquired. For divested segments, Profit Diff is calculated as the ROA of the divested 
segments minus the asset-weighted average ROA of other segments of the same firm, the whole 
multiplied by (-1), using the financial data before the segment was divested. Profit Diff [0, 1] is an 
indicator variable which takes a value of one if Profit Diff takes a positive value and zero otherwise. 
Segment Profit Variability is the decile rank of the range of segment ROA (i.e., the highest segment 
ROA – the lowest segment ROA). All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A reports the 
means of Profit Diff [0, 1] for change and no-change firms in each of the pre- and post-SFAS 131 
periods. Panel B reports the means of Profit Diff for change and no-change firms in each of the pre- 
and post-SFAS 131 periods. Panel C reports the results of the Probit regression of Profit Diff [0, 1] in 
Column 1 and the results of the OLS regression of Profit Diff in Column 2. To avoid potential 
problems with outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles. Standard errors are calculated by clustering industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and 
year because aggregate macroeconomic and industry demand shocks may induce some correlations 
with capital allocation decisions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Statistical significance is assessed by using one-sided p-values for variables with 
signed predictions and two-sided p-values otherwise. 
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Table 7 - Continued 
 
Panel A: Means of Profit Diff [0, 1] of Divested or Acquired Segments 
  Change Firms No-Change Firms 
Change – No-Change 
  
Difference 
Pre-SFAS 131 Period 
Profit Diff [0, 1] 0.2632 0.5263 -0.2632*** [t=-2.73] 
No. Obs. 38 76 
  
      
Post-SFAS 131 Period 
Profit Diff [0, 1] 0.4246 0.4273 -0.0027 [t=-0.04] 
No. Obs. 179 110 
  
      
 
Post – Pre Difference 0.1614* -0.0990 0.2605** 
 
  
[t=1.85] [t=-1.33] [t=2.27] 
 
 
 
Panel B: Means of Profit Diff of Divested or Acquired Segments 
  Change Firms No-Change Firms 
Change – No-Change 
  
Difference 
Pre-SFAS 131 Period 
Profit Diff  -0.5976 -0.0163 -0.5813*** [t=-2.63] 
No. Obs. 38 76 
  
      
Post-SFAS 131 Period 
Profit Diff  -0.1154 -0.1915 0.0761 [t=0.74] 
No. Obs. 179 110 
  
      
 
Post – Pre Difference 0.4822** -0.1752 0.6574*** 
 
  
[t=2.59] [t=-1.52] [t=3.04] 
 
 
 
65 
 
Table 7 - Continued 
 
Panel C: Multivariate Analyses of Profit Diff [0, 1] and Profit Diff 
  (1)   (2) 
 
Divested or Acquired 
 
Divested or Acquired 
 
Segment Sample 
 
Segment Sample 
Profit Diff [0, 1] 
 
Profit Diff 
 
Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Post 131 -1.0912 -1.42 
 
-0.4367 -1.24 
Change Firm -1.4263*** -3.77 
 
-0.7393* -1.88 
Post 131 × Change Firm (Pred. Sign: +) 1.4963*** 4.24 
 
0.7437** 1.77 
Log(Mktval) 0.0856 0.83 
 
0.0364 0.55 
MTB -0.0395 -0.93 
 
-0.0019 -0.07 
Cash Flows -0.8878 -0.44 
 
0.3589 0.26 
External Financing 0.0018 0.05 
 
0.0073 0.72 
Cash Holding 0.4900 0.50 
 
-0.3144 -0.31 
Leverage 0.2846 0.31 
 
0.1034 0.17 
Dividend -0.8619 -1.43 
 
0.0960 0.39 
Number of Segments 0.1260 1.22 
 
0.0090 0.10 
Segment Profit Variability 0.0247 0.32 
 
-0.0796 -1.25 
Segment Industry Diversity 0.2352 0.25 
 
-0.2722 -0.42 
Speed of Profit Adjustment -0.9395 -0.83 
 
0.1731 0.33 
Concentration Ratio -0.0374 -0.46 
 
0.0640* 1.88 
Segment Earnings Persistence 0.0074 0.20 
 
-0.0319 -0.41 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of Obs. 229 
 
390 
Pseudo / Adj. R
2
 0.1725  0.1607 
 
 
